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Abstract 
 
This thesis develops a model of structural power in society that builds upon 
Weber’s notion that several types of power exist in societies and that these types of 
power operate differently within societies. The purpose of this model is to help explain 
the political economy of development during Museveni’s tenure. The thesis argues that 
Museveni has centralized power through a complex system of patronage and repression. 
Furthermore, Museveni’s transformation from the leader of a cadre of ‘new breed 
leaders’ to ‘just another African big man’ results from his choice to centralize power as a 
means of achieving his revolutionary goals. While this thesis explains how this 
centralization occurred it does not explain why. The final chapter investigates some 
theoretical frameworks to explain why it has occurred. The thesis concludes by noting 
that a combination of these frameworks and the model developed herein offer several 
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 The early 1990’s saw the emergence of a “new breed” of African leader. The 
original triumvirate of Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afewrki of Eritrea and Yoweri 
Museveni of Uganda became internationally recognized as the scions of this new breed. 
Their embrace of Western political and economic values seemed, especially to leaders in 
Western donor nations, as a watershed for African politics. Gone were the days of 
Mobuto Sese Seko’s venal regime, gone were the days of Julius Nyerere and Jomo 
Kenyatta’s pan-Africanist movement. This new triumvirate would herald in the 
modernization of Africa. Among this new ruling class none were as magnanimous or 
successful as Yoweri Museveni.  
 New York Times journalist James McKinley, Jr. characterized international 
sentiments towards Museveni with this 1997 entry: 
These are heady days for the former guerrilla who runs Uganda. He moves with 
the measured gait and sure gestures of a leader secure in his power and in his 
vision.These days, political pundits across the continent are calling Mr. Museveni 
an African Bismarck. Some people now refer to him as Africa's ''other statesman,'' 
second only to the venerated South African President, Nelson Mandela.1 
 
McKinley is by no means measured in his adulation of Museveni. The same could be said 
of many the other new generation of leaders. Much political rhetoric was devoted, both 
within African and from without, to the political transformation of Africa. In the space of 
                                                
1 James C. McKinley Jr., “Uganda Leader Stands Tall in New African Order,” New York Times June 15, 
1997 at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/15/world/uganda-leader-stands-tall-in-new-african-order.html 
(accessed on 29 September 2011).  
2 
ten short years Museveni had gone from virtually unknown African rebel leader from the 
bush of Uganda, to the patriarch of African politics. Two policy developments in 
Museveni’s first ten years illustrate why the West attached itself to Museveni. First, 
Museveni’s rhetoric aligned his goals with Western ideals for Africa. Second, at a time 
when many African leaders skirted the growing issue of the AIDS pandemic Museveni 
confronted the disease. This confrontation of traditional taboo subjects demonstrated 
Museveni’s modernizing credentials and his ability to confront traditional notions of 
health and development. 
Museveni’s Acceptance of Western Ideals 
 One of Museveni’s qualities that most endeared him to Western nations was his 
acceptance of Western political and economic ideas and behaviors. Politically, Museveni 
was often heard excoriating previous African leaders for their extended tenures in office. 
On one occasion Museveni argued that Africa’s problem derived from leaders staying in 
office too long.2 This seemingly dramatic shift in African political rhetoric caught the 
attention of Western governments. In addition to his calls for shorter terms for African 
leaders Museveni’s system of and calls for increased decentralization of power further 
enshrined him as the scion of the new breed of African leaders. These new African 
political ideas also blended well with Museveni’s adherence to Western economic 
policies, particularly his embrace of neoliberalism, as Museveni moved to increase 
privatization levels3 and decrease overall government spending4. This adoption of such 
                                                
2 Will Ross, “Would Uganda’s Museveni Recognize His Former Self,” BBC News, 7 May 2011 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/9477930.stm.  
3 Roger Tangri and Andrew Mwenda, “Corruption and Cronyism in Uganda’s Privatization in the 1990’s,” 
African Affairs (2001): 117. 
3 
strict neoliberal policies in the heart of Africa opened the way for Western leaders to 
easily attach themselves to Museveni and his new government.  
Confronting the Reality of AIDS 
The second action taken by the government illustrates Museveni’s willingness to 
confront traditional notions of health and development. In 1986 the government of 
Uganda began confronting the challenge of HIV/AIDS. They instituted the ABC program 
(Abstinence, Be faithful, Condoms). In 1990 the HIV/AIDS infection rate in Uganda was 
roughly 15% of the total population.5Currently, the HIV/AIDS rate in Uganda has 
plummeted to nearly 5%.6  This program was effective due to its direct confrontation of 
the issue. This direct confrontation can be attributable to Museveni’s willingness to act. 
In this context Museveni came to be seen as an African modernizer, one who was willing 
and able to confront the reality of challenges facing African states. This program has 
served as model for many developing nations to confront the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  
Declining Favorability 
 Despite the aforementioned accomplishments in his first ten years in office, 
Museveni soon began to lose favor with the West. In the space of roughly ten years the 
Museveni led triumvirate of new African leaders have all but fallen out of favor with 
Western governments. American ambassador Jerry Lanier’s statement in a diplomatic 
cable epitomizes this declining favorability: “The President’s autocratic tendencies, as 
well as Uganda’s pervasive corruption, sharpening ethnic divisions and explosive 
                                                                                                                                            
4 The foundation ideas for decentralized government are outlined by Museveni in his book What is Africa’s 
Problem? (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, MN, 2000). 




population growth, have eroding [sic] Uganda’s status as an African success story.”7No 
longer are Museveni and the others eulogized as African modernizers, but are decried as 
African big men. How did Museveni go from the paragon of African political virtue to 
the epitome of African political dysfunction in such a short time-span?  
I argue in this thesis the Museveni’s transformation was, and is, a direct result of 
the length, nature, and consequences of his tenure in office. This extended tenure has 
been a direct result of his ability to maintain power in Uganda’s fractious society. While 
Museveni may have rhetorically accepted Western political ideals, he has governed 
according to the underlying political realities of Ugandan society. These realities derive 
from the ethnically divided nature of contemporary Ugandan society. In order to 
accomplish his desired goals and vision for his tenure Museveni choose to govern 
through informal, personal channels as opposed to formal, institutional channels. While 
on the surface Museveni has appeared to be building formal institutional structures that 
would allow greater influence for the rule of law, he was not. These efforts were merely a 
façade to cover his network of informal institutions. This thesis will demonstrate how this 
has occurred during his presidential tenure and will do so according to the following 
outline.  
In chapter 1 a model is developed that explains how the structure of power in 
Uganda’s society has shifted during Museveni’s presidential tenure. This model is first 
outlined conceptually and then applied to contemporary Ugandan society. This chapter 
argues that political authorities in Ugandan society have centralized power at the expense 
                                                
7 Emmanuel Gyezaho, “Wikileaks: Museveni Rule Eroding Uganda’s Success,” Africa Review, 
http://www.africareview.com/News/WikiLeaks+says+Museveni+eroding+Ugandas+success/-
/979180/1069488/-/bmj3lu/-/index.html (accessed 13 October 2011).  
5 
of social identities and cultural elements in society. This centralization underscores 
Museveni’s influence on contemporary Ugandan society. However, this model does not 
explain the political logic of Museveni’s actions. This is a shortcoming of the model that 
is further addressed in the final chapter. Despite this shortcoming the model developed 
nonetheless does explain the broader societal power dynamics of Museveni’s presidential 
tenure and for this reason the model was developed and employed. 
Next, chapter 2 deepens the understanding of how Museveni centralized societal 
power. In this chapter I argue that a logical system of patronage and repression allowed 
Museveni to entrench and expand his power throughout Uganda’s ethnically divided 
society. The central observation is that Museveni has pursued different patronage 
strategies in both northern and southern Uganda, but has equally repressed both halves of 
the country. This chapter focuses on outlining the nature of the systems, while leaving the 
description of the political logic to the concluding chapter.  
After reviewing the nature of Museveni’s structure of power maintenance chapter 
3 analyzes the positive and negative consequences of Museveni’s extended presidential 
tenure. The positive consequences are derivatives of the political and economic stability 
Museveni brought to Uganda. However, in many ways these positive developments 
represent the same political logic exhibited in Museveni’s patronage system. The 
negative consequences also exhibit a political logic but one that differs from the 
distribution of patronage and positive consequences. Like the motives of the patronage 
system, this political logic is synthesized in the concluding chapter. 
The 4 and concluding chapter will attempt to synthesize chapters 1-3 by 
describing the political logic of Museveni’s centralization of power. This political logic 
6 
sheds light on Museveni’s declining favorability. This logic illustrates that Museveni 
governed Uganda according to the underlying political realities of Ugandan society, 
namely the ethnically fractious nature of society. Had he not governed in such a way he 
would have never centralized and maintained power for the past thirty years. His choice 
to govern in this manner has led to his declining favorability in Western circles as many 








CHAPTER ONE: CONSTRUCTING SOCIETAL POWER STRUCTURES 
Societies are constructed according to those elements within the society that 
possess the greatest amount of power within the society. As defined in this thesis 
societies are comprised of four elements: 1) political 2) economic, 3) social identities, 
and 4) cultural. Each of these elements holds a unique place and function in a particular 
society. The main goal of each element of society is to secure for itself benefits via the 
acquisition of power. The figure below provides a visual model of what how elements 
relate to one another within a conceptualized society.  







What the model represents is the relationship between the political and economic 
elements in society and the social identities and their relationship to the cultural elements 
of society. The positioning of the elements within the model represent the position they 
play in society. Central to any society are the political and economic elements. Operating 
                                                
8 This model is adapted from a discussion the author had with Paul Viotti concerning the work of David 
Easton. For further detail concerning this work please see David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political 
Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).  
Political 




within those elements, and contributing to those elements, are the social identities of the 
society and the cultural practices/norms of the society. Lastly, the model illustrates that 
each element of society has a vested interest in maintaining proper power balances within 
the society.  
The self-interested pursuit of the acquisition of power shapes a society. 
Furthermore, the interactions between each element of society allow for a proper balance 
of power to be achieved and, theory a productive society to be shaped. Max Weber’s 
definition of power, “the chances [sic] which a man or a group of men have to realize 
their will in a communal activity, even against the opposition of others taking part in 
it,”9is a useful foundation from which to analyze these power acquisition interactions. As 
societal elements interact they begin to develop an intersubjective understanding of the 
others and the other’s place in the society. In this process some elements become 
relatively more powerful than the others in society. In the ideal society this process 
gradually leads to a set of productive relationships through processes of ‘give and take’ 
consensus building that allows mutual benefit to all elements of society. 
However, in reality what takes place is much different. The distribution of power 
throughout the elements of society become unequal and therefore affects the functioning 
of the societal system as a whole. Each element of society seeks to acquire power in order 
to realize their will at the expense of others within the system. This acquisition of power, 
and the subsequent distribution of power across the system, results in four main types of 
power: political, economic, citizen, and cultural. In essence each element seeks to push 
                                                
9 Max Weber, “The Distribution of Power in Society: Classes, Status Groups and Parties,” in Sam 
Whimster, The Essential Weber (New York: Routledge, 2004), 183. 
 
9 
itself into the prominent position within the system and therefore secure for itself, and its 
members, the privileges of systemic rule.10 This broad definition of power presented 
above is central to the purposes of this thesis as the idea of the individual or group is 
directly transferable to the concept of societal elements as presented here. These four 
types of power are different11 and with each exhibiting different characteristics upon the 
system and leading to the development of different types of societies. 
These developments in societies are dynamic and can shift over time due to 
different types of interactions between the different elements of society. In essence 
societies can be reshaped due to the emergence of another type of power that successfully 
supplants the dominant power holders and successfully restructures power in their favor. 
The French Revolution is an example of such an event occurring. During the Revolution 
political authorities maintained both political and economic power over social identities 
for centuries until the emergent strength of social identities overtook the systemic power 
of political authorities. Social identities used their own power to acquire economic power 
and completely reshaped society. The societal dynamism exemplified in the French 
Revolution is characteristic of systems focused on power acquisition. In order to 
understand the role of power in shaping societal constructions and identity it is important 
to examine more closely the four types of power outlined above.  
Types of Power 
As mentioned above four types of power exist within societies. Each element 
within society acquires power by it own mechanisms and processes. These different 
                                                
10 This helps to explain why so many political authorities to come to acquire systemic power: they start at 
the preeminent position within the system. 
11 Weber, 182. 
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mechanisms cause each type of power to exhibit different characteristics in the societal 
system. It is important to note that power is never distributed evenly across the entire 
system, but rather it is unevenly distributed as shaped by the interactions between the 
elements of society and the actions of individuals most in control of those elements. The 
distribution of this power is what eventually determines how the society is constructed 
and what identity the society takes on.  
Political Power 
 Political power is the most important form of power across any societal system. A 
simple definition of this type of power is the ability to enact, influence, or create codified 
law within a society. Often it forms the basis of the systemic law and order. A societal 
system cannot exist without political power. Regardless of the evolutionary position of 
the society (i.e. modern state, a nation, a tribal society) all societies, with the exception of 
hypothetical anarchies, must have authorities who determine laws and who enforce such 
laws. These authorities make up the political elements of society and wield political 
power within it. Both political authorities and political power exist in a symbiotic 
relationship that reinforces the preeminent position of the political elements within the 
societal system. Lastly, it is important to note that political authorities are initially created 
by the acquisition of political power; however, once created political authorities control 
political power, it creation and destruction. Both of these concepts are central to the 
acquisition of political power within societies. Examining how political authorities are 
created by political power and how they then come to control this power will illustrate 
this process of power acquisition.  
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 Political authorities are created by political power. The initial origin of this 
political power differs from society to society. Whether by inheritance, bestowal, the 
transfer of power via democracy, or through brute force all political authorities must 
become authorities through their acquisition of political power. Societies can experience 
a single acquisition of political power (as in the case of the United States social identities 
transferring power to representatives) or multiple transfers of power (as in the case of 
Haiti and its multiplicity of coups) over time, but rarely experience complete upheavals 
such as those witnessed in the French Revolution. Specifically in the African context, 
societies across the continent have consistently seen multiple transfers of power, often 
vacillating from the hands of social identities to those of political authorities. The 
frequency and type of transfer of political power has lasting effects on the overall society. 
Once transferred, regardless of how this initial political power is transferred, those who 
hold it, for better or worse, control the power.  
 Political authorities control political power as thy enact laws or other forms of 
institutions in regards to their status as the creators and enforcers of law. These laws or 
institutions can reinforce, strengthen, or destroy this position, and thus have a causal 
effect on political power. The enacting of laws to be enforced upon the other elements of 
society by political authorities weakens the other elements power position within the 
system; they are at the whim of the political authorities. The opposite is also true: the 
destruction of political power strengthens other elements of society. If left unchecked by 
the society, political authorities have the ability to create enough political power to 
overwhelm the entire system, or in other words acquire systemic power. This creation of 
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systemic rule by political power is ultimately destructive of the entire society, but 
beneficial to the political authorities. Adequate economic and citizen power can check the 
runaway growth of political power. 
Economic Power 
Much like political power economic power is vital for a society to successfully 
exist. However unlike political power that can be acquired through on interaction, 
economic power is acquired through multiple interactions between multiple elements 
over time. Furthermore, economic power is not controlled in the same manner that 
political power is controlled: economic power exists independent of those who hold it 
and is highly transferable. Those who hold economic power can wield considerable 
power within the system. However, their wielding of power does not necessarily result in 
destructive consequences in the same way systemic political power does. Lastly, 
economic power can be held by all in society and is not restricted solely to one class of 
people as is political power.  
As argued above economic power is acquired though multiple interactions with 
multiple societal elements over time. The result of these interactions is the acquisition of 
wealth, either in monetary form or other forms such as land. Economic power derives 
from this wealth. As more and more individuals within the economic sphere acquire more 
wealth more economic power is generated. However, because of this power is highly 
transferable it is not as easily controlled as political power.  
Despite its difficulty to control, the wielding of economic power can hold 
considerable sway over the societal system towards both positive and negative ends.  
 
13 
Positive benefits come when economic power is widely disbursed throughout society in 
the hands of large number of individuals. As larger numbers of individuals acquire 
economic power they now have agency in their lives thus empowering individuals to act 
for themselves and not to be acted upon by other element or actors in society. Most 
importantly the more disbursed economic power is away from political authorities the 
more productive the societal system can become. When economic power is outside the 
hands of political authorities individuals acting within the economy begin to gain power 
within the system and can counterbalance any attempts to grow political power.They can 
push back against political authorities when political authorities begin to encroach on 
their ability to gain wealth. However, when the acquisition of economic power is not 
regulated to the benefit of the system economic power becomes centralized in the hands 
of a few. This centralization creates negative consequences for the system.  
 The negative consequences associated with the centralization of economic power 
center on the loss of economic actors in society to act as a check on runaway political 
power. The centralization of economic power can take place in two ways. First, the most 
economically successful individuals can gradually acquire the majority of the economic 
power in the system through their own talent and success. This happens when few 
restraints are placed upon economic interactions over time. Second, economic power can 
be centralized as political authorities acquire economic power due to their political 
positions or through the co-optation of those holding the majority of economic power.  
Both types of economic centralization have negative, but different, systemic 
consequences. In the first instance the centralization makes it easier for economic power 
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holders to cooperate with political authorities. Thus rather than acting as a counterbalance 
on growing political power those holding economic power can align their actions with 
those of political authorities in order to secure their interests, namely the complete 
maximization of profits and market position. Cooperative relationships such as these do 
little to create the conditions for greater distribution of economic power and the 
subsequent long term society construction becomes unstable. 
In the second scenario when economic power becomes centralized under political 
authorities the society as a whole begins to break down. The acquisition of economic 
power by political authorities often occurs through nefarious means. The use of political 
position to secure government contracts or market positions undermines economic 
competitiveness and ultimately leads to a loss in overall productivity. Furthermore, if 
political authorities do acquire large amounts of economic power prior to acquiring 
political power they often use this political power to acquire more economic power thus 
having the same affects as in the first scenario.  
 The proper distribution of economic power is thus critical to maintaining a 
productive society. Proper distribution can act as a check on runaway political power. 
Conversely the centralization of economic power can actually serve to undermine 
competitiveness and in some ways serve to facilitate runaway political power. In order to 
ensure that the proper distribution of economic power occurs social identities must hold 




Power of Social Identities 
The power of social identities derives from the ability of individuals to organize 
in favor or against a cause, government action, or any other idea around which they feel 
to organize. This organization can take various forms and is not constrained to mere 
protests or opposition political movements. It is not only the nominal ability to organize 
that facilitates the acquisition of power but also the proven ability to do so. The 
intersubjective interaction between social identities and other societal actors, mainly 
political authorities, shapes their nominal and real ability to organize. These abilities are 
mainly shaped through the interactions with the political elements. Political authorities 
can quickly curtail or enhance this ability through legislative or arbitrary action. 
Therefore it is imperative that social identities and political authorities act cooperatively 
to shape the norms of citizen organization, as it is the mechanism for power acquisition. 
When large enough these social identities can acquire systemic power and 
overwhelm the other societal elements. It is also important to note than an individual 
cannot possess citizen power as it derives from group organization. Furthermore, the 
likelihood of the centralization of citizen power is very low as its very nature precludes 
multiple groups with diverse interests from coming together under one leadership 
umbrella. Precisely for these reasons citizen power is unlike political and economic 
power in that the accumulation of citizen power has very little if any negative 
consequences for the system. On the contrary large social identities are highly often be 
beneficial to the system, as groups are more capable of producing positive results from 
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collective actions than are individuals.12 Therefore with organization comes power within 
the societal system. This power leads to at least positive outcomes for the society.  
First, the diffuse nature of social identities allows them easily act as a type of 
organic oversight committee against unbridled economic centralization. Multiple interests 
exist within a society and these interests, if allowed to organize and acquire citizen 
power, are likely to seek out likeminded economic power holders in order to cooperate 
with them. Conversely, these interests are also likely to investigate economic power 
holders in order to expose their attempts at centralization or other nefarious practices. In 
both scenarios social identities and groups contribute to the continued diffusion of 
economic power: when cooperation takes place power is diffused and when activities are 
exposed economic power holders are often forced to concede certain levels power. They 
therefore help to create stability within the system, thus promoting a productive society.  
Second, the diffuse nature of social identities checks runaway growth in political 
power. Simply put when social identities feel their societal rights or liberties are being 
overwhelmed by encroaching political power they are able to organize against such 
actions. Social identities can quickly organize to acquire systemic power and overwhelm 
the political elements within the society. These social identities, often powerfully 
motivated by a collective cause, can reach tipping points from which they shape, or 
reshape, the distribution of power within the society in their favor if the right 
combination of authorities is involved.13 However, despite the ability to reach systemic 
                                                
12 David Brooks, The Social Animal: The Hidden Sources of Love, Character, and Achievement, (New 
York: Random House, 2011): 260.  
13 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, (New York: 
Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 33. 
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power fairly quickly and organically these groups often become disjointed quickly after 
achieving their objectives. Despite this lack of longevity these groups often leave behind 
powerful forms of social capital from which reorganization is usually possible. 
Thus the power of social identities is interconnected with economic and political 
power within the societal system. When a society is constructing itself productively each 
of these three elements serves to reinforce the productivity of the other. Economic power 
acts as a check on political power, social indefinites act as a check on the centralization 
of economic power and the runaway growth of political power, while political power can 
check, albeit in a negative way, the growth of social identities. Figure 2 illustrates how 
these three types of power interact with one another in an idealized, productive society as 
described in the previous paragraph. 






Cultural power derives from the ability to shape societal norms and behaviors. 
This power is often acquired and wielded by more traditional elements within the society 
(e.g. kings, tribal elders, churches), but is not restricted to these individuals or groups. It 
is possible that this power can be co-opted by the other three elements of society. 
Furthermore cultural power is not exclusive: multiple actors within the system can hold 
Political 
Social Identities Economic 
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this power. Thus cultural power is more diffuse throughout the system than the other 
types of societal power and is therefore more difficult to pinpoint its effects on the 
system. That said cultural power holds great power over the entire system. As can be seen 
in Figure 3 cultural power, in an ideal society, encapsulates the other power triangle 
relationship of the other three forms of societal power. This encapsulation is meant to 
represent the overarching nature of cultural power within the system. Furthermore, it 
represents the ideal that cultural power is shared among multiple actors across multiple 
elements of society. When cultural power is shared across multiple actors and multiple 
elements the system can function more productively as only one group does not shape the 
norms of various interactions.  







The ability to shape cultural norms and behaviors allows those possessing this 
power to establish behavioral norms for societies. This shaping of cultural norms is not a 
short-term proposition. Rather the shaping, or reshaping, of the cultural norms of 
interaction takes place over generations. It is this long-term nature of this process that 




Social Identities Economic 
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hold the greatest concentrations, but not all, cultural power. With this power traditional 
institutions can either condemn or encourage the development of negative societal 
consequences. For example, in the case of the centralization of economic power a 
traditional institution can come out against the centralization of power on the basis of its 
going against traditional economic practices, or it can encourage this practice by arguing 
the opposite.  
For a society to be productive cultural power must be used to shape norms in such 
a way that averts the negative consequences of systemic power acquisition. In an ideal 
positively functioning society cultural power is wielded in differing ways across the other 
elements of society. Traditional institutions can be, and often are, overruled by other 
societal elements, namely the political and economic, wielding cultural power. When this 
power becomes monopolized by one element of society it aids those societal actors in the 
acquisition of systemic power. This monopolization begins a dysfunctional set of 
processes that leads to an unproductive society. 
In the scenarios where traditional institutions are no longer the dominant wielders 
of cultural power, cultural norms are reshaped in systemically unbeneficial ways. 
Cultural norms can become co-opted by political and economic actors and reshaped in 
ways that benefit these elements in their pursuit of systemic power acquisition. Figures 3 
and 4 illustrate how the model shifts when cultural power is monopolized by either 
political or economic elements within society. The negative consequences of political 
authorities wielding systemic power and economic centralization are outlined previously. 
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But the important question remains: how does cultural power become centralized in non-
traditional institutions and elements? 













Political authorities monopolize cultural power using force or cooptation. Force is 
often used to eliminate traditional authorities for the societal system. This elimination 
does not singularly constitute murder or other forms of physical violence, but can also 
include arrest and exile. Political authorities can also use the force of state capability to 
overwhelm the influence of traditional authorities. Political authorities engage in high 
numbers of interactions in ways that reshapes cultural norms in their favor. These 
interactions often involve political authorities engaging with social identities and the 
Political 







economy in ways counter to how traditional leaders would interact. In this manner the 
ability to shape norms become that of the state and not traditional authorities simply 
based on the number of interactions the state engages in with other elements of society. 
Simply put, the state becomes more prominent in determining the rules of interaction 
within the society than the traditional authorities. This pattern of power acquisition is 
similar to the cooptation processes economic authorities use in their acquisition of 
cultural power. 
Economic actors regularly engage in dramatically higher number of interactions 
over a given period of time than other elements of society. It therefore follows that any 
attempt to reshape cultural norms in their favor could easily take place. Unlike political 
authorities, economic authorities merely seek to gradually reshape cultural norms through 
leveraging them towards the greater generation of wealth. Whereas political authorities 
can often seek to reshape cultural norms by erasing them and starting over, economic 
authorities seek to reshape them by interacting within them over time in their favor. Thus 
by interacting within these norms and making minor readjustments to them to fit them 
into their business interactions economic actors gradually co-opt cultural power and 
reshape societal norms. 
The question then arises concerning what effects these four types of power and 
the acquisition processes of each have on the societal construction and identity. As one 
might predict their effects differ, but they differ in the presence of different types and 
levels power found within the system. It is therefore not possible to discuss the effects of 
an individual power type in isolation. The challenge then becomes how can one identify 
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the presence of varying levels of a particular type of power within a system? Analyzing 
the societal construction and identity yields understanding as to which elements and types 
of power are most prominent in society. 
Each society is uniquely its own and as such must be analyzed within its historical 
context. One must discover the broad historical narratives of the society in order to fully 
understand and analyze its power interactions of the society. For this thesis the process of 
discovering the board historical narratives is difficult as pre-colonial Uganda experienced 
nearly 1000 years of various forms of societal interactions and little academic work has 
been done on those interactions. Nonetheless adequate work on the colonial and post-
colonial Ugandan society has been done and the reader is encouraged to seek these 
sources out from the reference list if more information is desired. The following section 
will attempt to sketch how Ugandan society is constructed to determine which forms of 
power are dominant within the system. Given the focus on the present some references 
will be given from earlier works on pre-colonial and colonial Ugandan society where 
relevant.  
Ugandan Society under Museveni 
The purpose of this section is to analyze the state of Ugandan society during the 
Museveni era through the previously outlined model of societal power.  In laying out the 
various types of power the purpose was to conceptually understand their sources and how 
they interact within a conceptual society. As the remainder of the chapter proceeds keep 
in mind that societies are not static and are products the broad historical trends of their 
construction. Uganda is no different.  
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Political Power in Uganda 
Political power in Uganda is centered squarely in the hands President Museveni. 
He has acquired this power at a steadily increasing rate over his nearly 30 years in power. 
What started as a popular ousting of the second Milton Obote government in favor of a 
more open, democratic and forward-looking government has in many ways become what 
it sought to replace. Museveni’s first ten years in office were non-democratic with 
himself as the ultimate voice of government, thus allowing him to acquire political power 
by decree. Furthermore, Museveni’s growing ability to influence parliament towards 
supporting his own agenda give him remarkable political power.14 
Museveni’s rise to power following the ousting of the unpopular Obote 
government, and his subsequent national vision, established his popularity within society. 
As recipients of this vast support and popular legitimacy, the government promised the 
restoration of democracy and constitutionalism. Thus, outlining their revolutionary aims 
of reconstructing power along democratic ideals. Sensing their own popular legitimacy 
political authorities postponed the beginning of these aims for ten years until 1995-96. 
While the reasons may not be wholly nefarious, one cannot help but to question why the 
regime waited for ten years to restore democracy. Regardless of the reason for delaying 
these processes, the Museveni government and the ruling party established itself as the 
dominant political entity over those ten years.  
Since the first elections held in 1996 and the restoration of nominal multipartyism 
has continued acquire political power based upon the groundwork it laid during its first 
                                                
14 Michael F. Keating, “Can Democratization Undermine Democracy? Economic and Political Reform in 
Uganda,” Democratization vol. 18 no. 2 (2011): 415. 
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ten years in office. As will be explored in a later chapter the regime has created multiple 
avenues to generate loyalty and support throughout the country. Furthermore, its 
background as an insurgent group has given rise to its repressive naturein its efforts at 
maintaining political. Thus, Museveni’s first ten years in office were the platform from 
which he acquired and then expanded his political power. Currently, Museveni’s political 
power is largely un-challenged, but cracks (rather large ones) are beginning to develop 
within his government.15 
Economic Power in Uganda 
The economic actors within Ugandan society are fairly independent of the 
government and have avoided the economic centralization that has taken place in many 
other one-party African states. The lists of the Ugandan rich and super rich demonstrate 
the diffusion of wealth throughout different sectors in Uganda. This diverse group of self-
made businessmen, large landholders, and a few government department executives 
should hardly be considered as a cadre of ruling party faithful or solely pursuing ruling 
party interests.16 This diffusion of economic power away from political authorities has 
always been a hallmark of Ugandan society and is one of the driving forces behind its 
resilience.  
This diffusion of economic power outside the hands of political authorities has 
often caused severe tensions to develop between the political authorities and economic 
                                                
15 I am speaking here of the split in 2000 between Kizza Besigye and Museveni, as well as the more recent 
political issues involving the CHOGM scandals and parliaments rejection of several cabinet level ministers 
following the 2011 election cycle.  
16Timothy Bukumunhe, “Who Are the Richest People in Uganda,” New Vision April 7, 2007, http://www. 
sundayvision.co.ug/detail.php?mainNewsCategoryId=7&newsCategoryId=132&newsId=558472 (accessed 
22 July 2011). 
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actors. At one point even Idi Amin expelled all “Asians” from the country in 1972 and 
took control of the economy in an effort to centralize economic power in political 
authorities. This centralization devastated the economy in multiple ways. Aside from this 
brief episode of Africanization and nationalization during the Amin years, the distribution 
of wealth has not changed significantly since independence; however, under Museveni 
the process by which wealth, and subsequently economic power, is acquired has.   
Since 1986 Uganda has undergone a significant economic liberalization program. 
The Museveni government has implemented and continues to implement neoliberal 
reforms in Uganda.17 Its adoption is tied to its relationship with the World Bank, which 
has been one of the largest institutional promoters of neoliberalism.18 The irony of 
Uganda’s adoption of neoliberalism is that this adoption process has been state guided 
and state owned.19 Political authorities have sought to oversee the implementation of the 
neo-liberal agenda and have created and odd mixture of surprisingly successful state-led 
neoliberal policies. However, political authorities did not merely view neoliberalism as a 
mechanism to spur growth and development, but also as a mechanism to acquire further 
economic power. 
Neoliberalism, like most aspects of the Museveni government, has been co-opted 
in Museveni’s continuing attempt to personalize the state. While the reforms appear to 
have contributed to a decade and a half of economic growth, they have also enlarged  the 
                                                
17 Anne M. Pitcher, “Conditions, Commitments, and the Politics of Restructuring in Africa,” Comparative 
Politics vol 36. no. 4 (July, 2004): 385. 
18 Sarah Babb, Behind the Development Banks: Washington Politics, World Poverty, and the Wealth of 
Nations, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009): 136. Since 1990 Uganda has received an average 
$2.03 billionper year from the World Bank 
19 Pitcher, 385.  
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capabilities of political authorities operating within the economy.20 The reach of the 
regime has been widened in two ways and this widening has increased the amount of 
economic power within the NRM. First, economic growth has increased the amount of 
money flowing into the government in the form of taxes and other forms of donor support 
and there is therefore more resources to distribute as patronage. Second, the economic 
growth that has taken place during the Museveni era has brought the government greater 
legitimacy in the southern ethnic Bantu portions of the country where much of this 
growth has occurred. While the south has seen great economic progress, the north has 
only seen stagnation and deprivation. The horizontal inequalities have contributed to 
many of the ethnic tensions during the Museveni’s tenure.  
Despite the enlarged capabilities of political authorities operating within the 
economy, economic power continues to be diffused throughout society. Non-ruling party 
actors holding economic power pursue their own interests and thus possess the ability to 
act as a check against any attempts by political authorities to acquire too much economic 
power. While this statement is true for the society as a whole, it is more difficult for those 
from the northern regions to check growing political power. The economic stagnation of 
northern Ugandan during Museveni’s tenure is thus allowing the ruling party to begin to 
acquire larger amounts of economic power in the north.  
Economic power in Uganda is structured differently in the northern and southern 
halves of the country. In the south economic power is widely diffused away from the 
ruling party and those holding this power possess the ability to check the growing 
                                                
20 Andrew Mwenda and Roger Tangri, “Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms and Regime Consolidation in 
Uganda,” African Affairs (July, 2005): 454. 
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political power of the Musevni government. In the north economic stagnation depleted 
any transformative economic capabilities and this lack of transformative economic 
capabilities forces the north to seek government assistance in generating economic 
development.21 From this assistance the Museveni government is slowly centralizing its 
economic power in the north.  
The Power of Social Identities in Uganda 
Despite the nominally democratic nature of the Ugandan system social identities’ 
hold relatively little power within society. Museveni and other political authorities hold 
large amounts of political power, which they use to overwhelm and suppress the power of 
social identities. Under this construction social identities find it difficult to create 
effective interest organizations opposed to regime interests. The nature of Uganda’s 
constitution is such that citizen are afforded the right to peacefully assemble and 
organize22; however, the effectiveness of opposition organizations is lacking. Groups that 
are effective at pursuing their interests are those whose interests are aligned with the 
regime. This cooptation stifles many attempts to effectively check the runaway growth of 
political power of the Museveni government.  
Two areas of potential power reflect this trend: opposition protests and the press. 
First, as discussed in more detail in chapter three opposition protests are often repressed 
both institutionally through the codification of law and violently through physical 
                                                
21 This is most evident in the most recent National Development Plan. In this plan the government calls for 
increased investment in agricultural processing in the north as to be directed by the government. This plan 
forces northern Ugandans into dependency on the central government. This dependency quickly yields 
economic power to the central government.  For more details see The Republic of Uganda. National 
Development Plan 2010/11-2014/15. Kampala, Uganda, 2010 
22 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995, Chapter  4.29.1.a and 4.29.1.e. 
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violence. Both types of repression have rarely hindered the actual gathering of protest 
groups that seek to check political power or influence the direction of government, but 
rather the organizations have had little influence over the actual course of government 
decisions. The most recent walk to work protests did little to change the actual course of 
policy and in many ways served to reinforce the ability to the central government to 
dominate the societal system.  
Second, and perhaps more importantly than the lack of effective opposition 
groups, is the lack of a state run press. The New Vision group is notorious for its support 
from and backing of the Museveni regime.23 In Uganda there are several African 
language papers and are two main English language dailies. One of the most 
disconcerting aspects of Uganda’s media culture is the dominance of the New Vision 
Media group. Of the four major African language papers the New Vision group owns all 
of them. Thus, government interests are easily disseminated throughout the country via 
the New Vision apparatus. The ability of the government to reach into the ethnic majority 
areas gives political authorities the advantage when it comes to shaping political 
discourse. Shaping political discourse in favor of the government in ethnically unfriendly 
regions allows the government to potentially win support from this coverage. Thus, even 
in matters of the press the Museveni government attempts to extend its reach via ethnic 
mechanisms.  
The English language media market also experiences the same dynamics of 
government influence. The two main English-language dailies are published by the New 
                                                
23 The central government established the flagship paper New Vision following its consolidation of power 
and continues to hold 53% of publicly traded shares in the New Vision Media Group. 
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Vision group, which publishes New Vision and the Monitor group, which publishes Daily 
Monitor. The dominance of New Vision can be seen in the circulation of both papers with 
the New Vision holding a nearly sixty-five percent (65%) market share.24 With English 
language papers being the only nationally distributed ones, the government is easily able 
to influence public discourse on any pressing national topic. When taken in connection 
with the high distribution in the non-English language papers one quickly can see the 
dominance political authorities have over civil society discourse and potential actions.  
Cultural Power in Uganda 
Tribal authorities have traditional held cultural power in Uganda. Due to the 
nature of British colonial boundaries multiple centers of cultural power have existed 
within the country. Given that individuals acquire cultural power through their ability to 
dictate societal norms of behavior these multiple centers of power have competed and at 
times collided with one another. While there is not space to give a detailed recital of the 
traditional kingdoms in present day Uganda, suffice it to say that the most prominent and 
powerful kingdom is the kingdom Buganda.25 Given its status within Uganda, the 
Buganda kingdom holds great sway in shaping the future of Ugandan society. For this 
reason Buganda kingdom will be used as a case for examining cultural power in Uganda 
and the ways in which it influences the society.  
                                                
24 Uganda Securities Exchange, “ Company Details,” http://www.use.or.ug/copindex.php?cat= 
lstofallco&subcat=lstcodir&cop=89 (accessed 20 July 2011).  
25 For more information on the history of traditional kingdoms in Uganda see the following: Thomas 
Ofcansky, Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) and Donald Anthony 
Low, Fabrication of Empire: The British and the Uganda Kingdoms, 1890-1902, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).  
 
30 
As an institutional regime Buganda kingdom receives great loyalty from its 
people.26 This loyalty is often fiercely held among its members. One kingdom member 
was quick to point that he considered himself first a Baganda before several other group 
associations. He then pointed out that being a Ugandan was maybe fifth or sixth down on 
the list of self-described associational relationships.27 This loyalty turns into strict 
adherence to kingdom interests. Some government actions cannot become legitimate in 
the eyes of the people without the ‘blessing’ of traditional kingdom heads.28 However, 
this is not always the case.  
Furthermore, the population living within Buganda kingdom is the largest of any 
traditional kingdom in the country. Combined with the kingdom loyalty mentioned above 
Buganda often plays a kingmaker role in Uganda presidential politics. Despite the 
historic tensions between Buganda and the presidential office,29 the kingdom has mostly 
been a supporter of Museveni’s government. This quasi-official support of Museveni has 
allowed him to retain some of the popular legitimacy within Buganda kingdom that he 
originally had in the beginning of his tenure. Yet despite this support the kingdom still 
(and this is true of the other kingdoms also) has legitimate concerns over the continued 
attempts of the central government to acquire cultural power.  
                                                
26 This is also true of the other traditional kingdoms as well.  
27 Ssimbwa Busulwe, 19 April 2010, Interview with author.  
28 This was made clear to the author when interviewing one Ugandan who gave an anecdote concerning a 
government run child vaccination program. The program initially got no support within the kingdom and 
very few children received vaccinations from the local administrators. However, this quickly changed when 
the Kabaka, made a radio announcement supporting the vaccination program. Soon the program was very 
successful within the kingdom.  
29 For more information on these tensions see the following: Kenneth Ingram, Obote: A Political Biography 
(London: Routledge, 1994) and Jim Ocitti, Political Evolution and Democratic Practice in Uganda, 1952-
1996 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 80-88. 
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Increasingly Museveni is moving to strip traditional authorities (not just in 
Buganda, but in the entire country) of their ability to shape the behavioral norms of their 
subjects. Specifically, Museveni continues to quarrel with some traditional authorities 
regarding their proper role should be in national politics. During the most recent election 
cycle Museveni made it clear that traditional rulers of all ethnic backgrounds had no 
place in national politics and moved to codify this position.30 The pushback from these 
authorities forced the regime to slightly modify legislation. Nonetheless it still passed 
parliament and became law, thus curbing the cultural power of traditional authorities. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a framework for analyzing power in societies and 
applied it to the case of the current Ugandan society. What this analysis reveals is 
Museveni’s government currently holds the vast majority of power in society (see Figure 
5). This acquisition of systemic power gives Museveni the ability to pursue, and secure, 
his two main interests virtually unopposed from the other elements of society. Ironically, 
Museveni’s two interests are conflictual. Firstly, his interest is to maintain power in 
Uganda’s ethnically diverse society in order to bring about national and economic 
development. Museveni believes that his government is the only government capable of 
achieving this goal. Secondly, his interests, rhetorically at least, is to shift power away 
from political leaders in hopes of overcoming the ethnic divisions within Uganda society. 
The irony lies in the fact that maintaining power makes shifting power towards social 
identities less likely.  
                                                
30 The Institution of Traditional or Cultural Authorities Bill, 2010, Part V.13.1-3. at 
http://www.kituochakatiba .org/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=1217&Itemid=36 
(accessed 22 July 2011) 
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The model below represents how power relationships in Uganda are currently 
structured. As argued above the Museveni government has taken several measures to 
monopolize cultural power in Uganda and therefore cultural power is currently firmly 
centered within the political authorities of society. One can also notice from the model 
that the relationship between social identities and political elements runs in only one-
way: from political elements to social identities. As will be argued in further detail 
throughout this thesis, social identities have little ability to organize to act as a check on 
runaway political power. In essence, they have become subjects to political authorities 
instead of active participants. Despite this inability of social identities to check runaway 
political power, political authorities have not overwhelmed the entire system. A two-way 
relationship between the political and economic elements continues to exist. Therefore it 
is possible, but unlikely due to the relative prosperity gains achieved under the Museveni 
regime, that the economic elements can check runaway political power.  






Given this model I argue that the political elements of Uganda dominate the 
society within a distinct north-south ethnic divide. In order to achieve the most important 







centralization of power while balancing the historic ethnic tensions of the society. 
Museveni’s acquisition systemic power also does not portend positively for the Ugandan 
society’s ability to achieve these goals. The likelihood of the transferring power away 
from political authorities is unlikely given the ways Museveni has maintained societal 
power. The exception to this would be another violent political transition.  
 
 34 
CHAPTER TWO: MAINTAINING POWER IN UGANDA’S ETHNIC SOCIETY 
From the Bush to the Banquet: Distributive Patronage under Museveni 
Museveni’s ability to maintain political power in Uganda’s ethnically divided 
society rests on his ability to leverage institutional patronage in the pursuit of his two 
earlier referenced interests. Institutional patronage in Uganda takes two forms: 
decentralization and co-optations of civil society. The institutional nature of the 
patronage network makes it more difficult to differentiate it from normal government 
activities. This section argues that Museveni’s patronage strategy contains multiple 
internal inconsistencies due to his competing interests. Inconsistencies that derive from 
Museveni’s attempts to bridge key divisions within Ugandan’s society. The ultimate 
consequence of these inconsistencies is the further centralization of power within 
political authorities.  
Democracy Now: Government Decentralization in Uganda 
The purpose of any good patronage network is to weld individuals and groups to a 
single political authority, via favors, positions, and other forms of graft. In a hybrid 
regime31 such as Uganda’s political authorities often use tactics that “weaken all 
independent centers of power”32 in order to accomplish this task. Andrew Mwenda calls 
these attempts to weaken independent centers of power in Uganda the “institutional 
fragmentation” of the government.33 In describing this fragmentation Mwenda details 
how Museveni and his government have contributed to a proliferation of organizations 
                                                
31 Aili Mari Tripp, Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime, (Lynn Reinner: Boulder, 
CO, 2010), 9-36.  
32 Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions 
ininAfrica,” World Politics Vol. 46, no. 4 (July, 1994): 462. 
33 Andrew Mwenda, “Personalizing Power in Uganda,” Journal of Democracy, (2007): 30. 
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and government levels. The growth of administrative sub-national districts is an example 
of this phenomenon. In 1980, six years prior to Museveni’s military takeover there were 
33 administrative districts and at the end of 2010 there were 112 districts34(see Figure 1) 
and recent reports suggest that the government is going to create 21 new districts bringing 
the total to 133 districts.35 This is a staggering amount of districts36 when one remembers 
that according the latest census data Uganda has roughly 25 million37 people and best 
estimates of present day population is around 33 million.38 Mwenda argues that this has 
been one of the most effective ways for Museveni to enlarge his patronage.39Furthermore, 
the local governments are a direct reflection of the larger patronage network and the 
growth thereof.40The expanding nature of the patronage network is disturbing to 
concerned social identities as this growth represents political authorities’ attempts to 
acquire larger amounts political power.  
Along with the number of districts, the distribution of districts throughout the four 
regions of Uganda is another indicator that the government has used institutional 
decentralization as part of its patronage network. Museveni and the NRM receive their 
strongest support from the west and central regions of the country and conversely receive 
                                                
34 David Kaiza, “How the Gifts of Districts Are Ruining Uganda,” The Monitor March 8 , 2011 (accessed 
March 16, 2011) http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/1120984/-/c41waez/-/index.html 
35 Mercy Nulagno, “Government Proposes 21 New Districts,” Daily Monitor, August 25, 2011 (accessed 
August 25, 2011) at http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/1224472/-/bjvi87z/-/index.html. 
36 Uganda is number one on the list for the amount of sub-national administrative districts per country in 
the world. See the Global Administrative Database website at www.gadm.org for a data set on these 
statistics.  
37 Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2002 Uganda National Census, (Kampala, Uganda, 2002) access at  
http://www. ubos.org/onlinefiles/uploads/ubos/census_tabulations/centableB2.pdf (accessed 21 April 2011) 
38 United States Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Worldfact Book 2010, at https://www.cia.gov/library 
/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html.  
39 Ibid., 31. 
40 Nsamba A. Morris, “Breeding Fragmentation? Issues in the Policy and Practice of Decentralization in 
Uganda,” Issue Paper no 1. June 2009, 6 
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the least amount of support from the northern and eastern regions. Historic ethnic 
tensions in existence (and continues to exist) at the time of Museveni’s consolidation of 
power are to blame for this distribution of support.41 According to the most recent 
national census conducted in 2002, 5,363,669 people live in the northern region, live 
6,204,915 people in the eastern region, 6,575,425 people live in the central region and 
6,298,075 people live in the western region. As of July 2010 the northern region of 
Uganda had 30 districts, the eastern region had 32, the central region had 24 and the 
western region had 26. If the purpose of decentralization is to allow Ugandans more 
opportunities to participate in government and better representation in parliament then 
would it not follow that there would be more districts in the central and western regions 
than the northern and eastern? That the data demonstrates the opposites suggests that the 
regime is creating districts within the northern and eastern regions of the country as a 
patronage mechanism to bridge the ethnic divide hindering deeper governmental 
legitimacy in the region.  
Any perception of tribal and ethnic group preference in the government has 
historically created divisions within Uganda. The creation of more districts in the north 
and east is an attempt to bridge this tribal divide through patronage. In creating these 
districts the government has attempted the dual purpose of creating better governance 
structures, or at least the appearance thereof, while extending its reach into areas of less 
                                                
41 See the Uganda Electoral Commission website at http://www.ec.or.ug/eresults.html for more detailed 
information on the electoral support that Museveni and the NRM have garnered in the west and central 
regions since the reintroduction of electoral politics in 1995.  
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support.42 If successful the government will not only have overcome historical ethnic 
tensions and shifted power towards social identities in the north and east, but also will 
have manufactured political support in previously unfriendly regions. 
Figure 1. Administrative Districts in Uganda.43 
 
 
                                                
42 Some of the recent districts such as Pader district and other districts in the north and east were created 
specifically for this reason. The government argues that the larger district of Kitgum was neglecting the 
region of the newly created Pader district.  
43Uganda Bureau of Local Government, Latest Map of Uganda July 2010, (Kampala, Uganda, 2010), 
access at http://molg.go.ug/2010/08/04/latest-map-of-uganda-july-2010/ 
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Under this guise of increased democratic accountability Museveni has been able 
to extend his reach throughout Ugandan society. Museveni’s statement upon the creation 
of 14 new districts in 2005 reflects his rhetoric that increasing the number of districts 
increases democracy in Uganda: “although a new district takes a lot of money, this is the 
democracy we fought for. People must ask for what they want and get.”44With the large 
sums of money distributed at the start of a new district it is easy to see why the 
government has used decentralization as the cover for its patronage network.45 It is easier 
to extend a patronage network when the money is offered through formal government 
channels than it is to transfer suitcases of cash around. The ability of the government to 
use its formal revenue distribution structures hides much of this distribution. 
Analyzing the categories of revenue district administrations receive from the 
central government illustrates how this decentralization process has operated as part of 
the patronage regime. Local governments receive approximately 39 different categories 
of funding from the central government. These categories range from various types of 
salaries to infrastructure/maintenance issues. Two of these funding categories are of a 
more dubious nature: the district unconditional grant and the urban unconditional grant. 
The regime gives these funds to “local governments to spend on activities, which the 
local governments themselves choose, such as salaries, administrative costs, and 
development activities.”46 While the government does attempt to publicize the amount of 
                                                
44Ocwich, “Can Uganda’s Economy Support More Districts?,” New Vision August 8, 2005  
45 Denis Ocwich, “Can Uganda’s Economy Support More Districts?,” New Vision August 8, 2005 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/26/449320 (accessed 16 March 2011). Mwenda, 2007, 31 notes several 
reasons why government decentralization and decentralized budgeting are central to the success of the 
patronage network. 
46 Uganda Ministry of Finance, The Uganda Budget 2004/2005: A Citizen’s Guide, (Kampala: Government 
of Uganda, 2004), 15.  
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money distributed to the local government under these categories in order to facilitate 
social identities holding officials more accountable, it is nonetheless too easy for local 
governments to siphon this money to suit their personal interests.47 If the central 
government had an interest in reforming the system it would eliminate these 
unconditional grants. The ease at which these grants can be distributed makes them a 
perfect option of economic patronage to distribute throughout the north and east of the 
country.  
Rhetorically, Museveni began this decentralization process much for the same 
reasons that any decentralization takes place: increased democratic functioning and 
efficiency. However, instead of creating a more efficient and accountable government 
structure as one would expect, it has “become and ally and reinforcer of personal rule.”48 
Decentralization has allowed more individuals to receive state funding and these 
individuals have become beholden to the government and not to other centers of power. 
In essence what started under donor pressure to decentralize was co-opted for personal 
purposes. Thus, the decentralization scheme in did little to shift power away from 
themselves in society, but had the opposite effect of actually centralizing greater power in 
their hands. Lastly, the expansion of districts in the north and east of the country has 
allowed Museveni to extend his reach deeper into ethnically unfriendly portions of the 
country. 
                                                
47 Johnson Bitarabeho, Curbing Corruption and Promoting Transparency in Local Governments: The 
Experience of Bushenyi District, Uganda, (Washington D.C.: World Bank Institute, 2003), 3.  
48 Mwenda, 2007, 31. 
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Rearranging the Chairs: Cabinet Appointments under Museveni 
While decentralization has been a powerful patronage mechanism to bridge ethnic 
divisions in the north and eastern regions of the country, the regime has used cabinet 
positions as distributive patronage for the west and central regions. By promoting 
individuals from his own ethnic region Museveni undermines his attempts to bridge 
national ethnic tensions. Museveni’s promotion of individuals from the west and central 
regions to cabinet posts is at odds with his rhetoric of a unified and ‘non-sectarian’ 
Uganda. The government reinforces the historical north-south ethnic tensions through the 
exclusion of northern politicians from viably participating in governing the country. By 
failing to bridge this historic tension the government fails to shift power away from the 
political authorities in society; by reinforcing the underlying historic ethnic tensions 
Museveni reinforces his own power in society. 
Since taking office the size of Museveni’s cabinet has dramatically increased in 
size and ethnic uniformity has characterized its composition. For most of Uganda’s post-
independence history the size cabinet ranged from between 15-30 ministers.49 This 
pattern persisted in the early years of the Museveni era. However, following his victory in 
the 2001 elections, in which the first real signs of political opposition emerged, Museveni 
quickly increased the cabinet to 65 ministers. He then increased the size to 69 ministers in 
2006 and again to 74 following the 2011 elections.50 This packing of the cabinet “allows 
[Museveni] to personalize decision-making authority without necessarily weakening the 
                                                
49 Joseph Kizza, “Uganda’s Cabinet Sizes,” New Vision, June 7, 2011, http://www.newvision.co.ug/detail. 




capacity of the organizations in question.”51 Museveni’s ability to expand the cabinet 
beyond the constitutional limit of 21 ministers derives, at least up until now, from the 
absence of an effective parliamentary opposition.52 MPs and the regime share a common 
interest in this further institutionalization of patronage. The constitution stipulates 
parliamentary approval is required to the size of the cabinet and the regime relies on its 
parliamentary cadre to expand the institutional nature of the patronage regime in this 
way.53 The regime can secure more support through political appointments and MPs can 
demonstrate their NRM credentials in hopes of receiving a cabinet level ministerial post. 
This common interest in constructing cabinet patronage undermines governmental 
efforts at bridging ethnic divides elsewhere in society and undermines its efforts to shift 
power away towards social identities. Since the majority of the central government 
support comes from the west and central regions of the country, the majority of the NRM 
cadre in parliament is from the Bantu portion of the country. This in turn facilitates the 
broad ethnic uniformity in Museveni’s cabinet composition. A recent report in The 
Observer, a leading Ugandan newspaper, notes the following historical pattern within 
Museveni’s cabinet:  
Of the 229 ministers Museveni has so far had for the 25 years he has been 
president, 70 have hailed from western Uganda, which accounts for 30.6%, 
                                                
51 Dan Slater, “Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Instutions and the Personalization of Power in 
Malaysia,” Comparative Politics, vol. 36, no. 1 (October, 2003): 89. 
52 Constitution of Uganda Section 113.2. 
53 In previous years parliament has been complicit by simply not opposing Museveni’s cabinet 
appointment. However, several of the most recent appointees were rejected by NRM MP’s, thus effectively 
halting Museveni’s appointment of those individuals. This may be the most important development in 
Ugandan politics. While the parliament seems to be pushing back for now, one would expect Museveni to 
push back against parliament in subtle, yet personalizing ways.  
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followed by 65 from the central region (28.4%). Eastern Uganda has had 51 
ministers (22.3%) and the north, 43 (18.8).54 
 
This historical pattern also presents itself in the current cabinet (Table 1). Given 
the historic tensions between the Bantu southern parts of the country and non-Bantu 
north, Museveni’s distribution of ministerial positions to those of Bantu origin creates a 
perception (or reality) of ethnic uniformity within the cabinet, thus further entrenching 
north/south ethnic distrust.55This distrust disrupts any possibility of shifting power 
towards social identities. Without the necessary cross-ethnic trust in place the 
government only serves to reinforce its own power in society, while weakening the 
ability of the society to shift power away from political authorities.  
Table 1. Current Regional Composition of Ugandan Cabinet.56 
Region Total Cabinet Posts Senior Level Posts 
Western 22 13 
Central 21 10 
Eastern 18 4 
Northern 14 3 
 
The different patronage strategies towards the north/east and west/central are 
significant in that they reveal the extent to which the regime’s rhetoric of overcoming 
tribalism and sectarianism in order to shift power towards social identities is mere 
                                                
54 Michael Mubangizi, “West, Buganda Dominate in Ministers Since Independence,” The Observer, May 
29, 2001 accessed at http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13623 
&Itemid=59 (accessed on 8 June 2011). See also Melina Raquel Platas, “Why Museveni Keeps More 
Westerners, Baganda in Cabinet,” The Independent, January 19, 2011 http://www.independent.co.ug/cover-
story/3823-why-museveni-keeps-more-westerners-baganda-in-cabinet (accessed 8 June 2011). 
55 Stefan Lindemann also argues that this ‘elite bargain explains Uganda’s propensity towards civil war in 
Stefan Lindemann, “Just Another Change of Guard? Broad-based Politics and Civil War in Museveni’s 
Uganda,” African Affairs, vol. 110 no. 440 (May, 2011):387-416.  
56 Derived from Moses Mulondo, “Cabinet: How the National Cake Was Shared,” Sunday Vision, May 28th 
2011, http://www.sundayvision.co.ug/detail.php?mainNewsCategoryId=7&newsCategoryId=123&newsId= 
755991 (accessed 8 June 2011).  
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rhetoric. On the one hand, decentralization as a patronage mechanism allows the regime 
to extend its reach into discontented areas to buy their loyalty with patronage, oversee 
any developments in the region, and support grassroots democracy within society. But, 
the government’s actions elsewhere illustrate its lack of intention of moving democracy 
down a decentralized path that does not ultimately benefit its own ends. Buying support 
allows the government to modestly bridge the north/south ethnic tensions that have 
dominated sub-regional political interactions over history. However, this modest bridging 
is limited only to the interactions between the central government and these sub regions. 
It has not extended to other north/south interactions. Therefore the regime has not 
actually overcome the historic ethnic tensions permeating Ugandan society, but rather 
leveraged modern political ideologies imported from the West to manufacture support in 
an otherwise hostile region.  
On the other hand cabinet positions have been used in the west and central regions 
to reward loyalty and to shore up political bases, thus actually further entrenching the 
very ethnic tensions the regime seeks to end. Unlike in the north and east of the country, 
the west and central have historically been supportive of Museveni and this support has 
not gone unnoticed. The subsequent cabinet appointments have strengthened the 
relationship between the regime and Bantu ethnic groups. Overtime these strengthened 
relationships have acted as a check on sectarianism in this region as more and more 
ethnic groups give loyalty to the regime; however, and more dangerously, it has served to 
strengthen the ethnic tensions between the northern and southern ethnic groupings. 
Despite Museveni’s attempts to bridge ethnic divisions through distributive patronage the 
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ethnic tension dividing Uganda have not subsided. This dualistic nature of his patronage 
strategy is to blame and only serves to undermine attempts to reshape societal power 
structures. 
Conflicted Loyalties: Women’s Representatives in Uganda’s Parliament 
Along with decentralization and the distribution of cabinet positions Museveni’s 
government has been able to co-opt civil society movements in an attempt to reshape the 
political discourse. In doing this, political authorities have curbed citizen’s attempts at 
acquiring the power needed to check anyway possible runaway growth of political power. 
One of the most prominent examples of this is the establishment of the women’s quota 
representation system in parliament. The quota system effectively co-opted one of the 
larger civil society movements in Uganda. Its establishment was meant to appease a 
vibrant women’s movement in the early days following the 1986 power consolidation. 
This early appeasement of the women’s movement wedded the women’s representatives 
in parliament to the NRM, despite sometimes-divergent legislative views. 
Early after the success of the bush war, Museveni recognized the need to 
incorporate the women’s movement within his government. Once in power he moved 
quickly to distribute government positions to the women’s movement. However, these 
positions were not in the form of powerful ministerial positions, but rather they were 
added-on quota seats for women’s representatives in parliament. These seats were tied to 
the number of administrative districts, and as such their number keeps growing. This 
continued growth in the number of districts further co-opts the women’s movement as 
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greater numbers of women’s representatives are elected to parliament and become part of 
the formal government power structure. 
 Far from advancing women’s political standing in the Ugandan parliament and in 
the broader government this add-on quota has actually served to stifle women’s political 
power and coherence.57Women’s quota seats have left many women feeling conflicted 
about who they actually represent – women or the constituents in their district.58 Ann 
Marie Goetz argues that this mechanism for women’s participation is “based on the 
principle of extending patronage to a new clientele.”59 The current quota system 
discourages the women’s movement from developing a certain level of autonomy due to 
its reliance on formal government structures, mainly parliament, for its voice in society. 
Instead of developing this needed autonomy the women’s movement is gradually 
becoming, or in many instances has become, part of Museveni’s system. 
 Women’s representatives MPs party affiliation demonstrates how this lack of 
autonomy actually incorporates the movement into Museveni’s patronage system. Table 
2 illustrates how women’s representatives overwhelmingly have chosen to affiliate with 
the NRM. 73% of all women’s representative are affiliated with the ruling party. This is 
nine percentage points higher than the overall NRM representation in parliament, which 
has 210 MPs out of the total 327 or 64%. This suggests that the women’s representatives 
are part of the patronage system and see their opportunity for a voice in society as tied to 
the NRM.  It further suggests that the regime has co-opted the women’s movement as 
                                                
57 Ann Marie Goetz, “No Shortcuts To Power: Constraints on Women’s Political Effectiveness in Uganda,” 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 40 no 4 (December, 2002): 572. 
58 Ibid., 558 
59 Goetz, 558. 
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function of its patronage network. By co-opting a large portion of the civil society 
movement the regime has been able to stifle citizen’s attempts to acquire citizen power 
through the women’s movement. This stifling has allowed the regime to avoid shifting 
power towards social identities on the grounds that the social identities are already a part 
of the regime itself. Justifying its power acquisition in this manner further entrenches 
power within the political elements of society.  
Table 2. Party Affiliation of Women’s Representative MPs in 8th Parliament.60 
Party Affiliation Number 
NRM 58 
Independent 11 
Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) 10 
Total 79 
 
In general the co-optation women’s movement also represents a significant 
attempt at bridging the tribal tensions in Uganda’s political system. By focusing 
patronage on the broader women’s movement and not simply women from one tribe, the 
government can claim to be reaching out to bridge the ethnic divides via civil society and 
the women’s movement. This allows the regime to deflect any criticisms of favoring one 
ethnic group over another. In essence the regime has been able to shape the political 
discourse away from ethnic politics via its patronage of civil society 
.The NRM patronage system is vast and growing larger. With the number of 
districts increasing on an almost yearly basis the reach of Museveni and the government 
extends into ever-smaller units of society. Increasing administrative districts also serves 
                                                
60 The Parliament of  the Republic of Uganda, List of Members of Parliament (The 8th Parliament), 
(Kampala, Uganda, 2011) access at http://www.parliament.go.ug/index.php?option=com_wrapper 
&Itemid=37( accessed 18 April 2011) 
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the political purpose of distributing patronage to ever-larger percentages of the 
population in hopes of bridging ethnic tensions. However, this practice is undermined by 
Museveni’s regionally based appointment of cabinet ministers. Furthermore, the 
continued use of parliamentary quotas for women’s government representation creates 
fragmented loyalties within the women’s movement. And keeping the quota system as 
part of the legislative institutional structure political authorities can assure support from a 
large portion of society.  
While institutionalizing patronage networks requires more effort than simply 
distributing benefits doing so has clearly benefitted the Museveni government. Despite 
promoting itself as a new type of regime the Museveni era has been characterized by 
many of the same political practices of previous Ugandan governments. The regime has 
not significantly changed since independence and political authorities have created a 
political environment that encourages the further institutionalization of patronage and 
personal rule in Uganda.  This political culture creates institutional inertia against the 
reconstructing of societal power within society by further entrenching north/south ethnic 
tensions. 
Repression 
 When patronage is not adequate the government has employed various means of 
both institutional and violent repression.  Because Museveni promoted himself and his 
regime as a new model of African leadership the regime could not continue the brutal 
violence of the Amin government; however, the NRM has created a delicate balance of 
violent intimidation and institutionalized repression of basic constitutional freedoms, 
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such as the freedom of speech and association. In regards to violence the government has 
employed ‘private’ plain cloth militias, the police and the Uganda People’s Defense 
Force (UPDF) to intimidate and coerce social identities into following government 
demands. The government's response in three separate cases (the 2009 Kayunga riots, the 
2010 Kasubi Tomb burning riots, and the 2011 Walk-to-Work protests) illustrates their 
employment of repression as a tool to curb the ability of social identities to acquire power 
in society. In each situation the government moved to curtail constitutional rights via 
presidential decree and enforced these decrees via violence. These instances also 
demonstrate the regime’s primary interests of maintaining power at the expense of 
shifting societal power towards social identities. 
2009 Kayunga Riots 
Relations between the Buganda Kingdom and the central government have been 
tense since independence. The tensions derive from the central role the Buganda 
Kingdom played during the colonial era.61 The highly organized kingdom has always 
pressed the central government to create a federal structure along the lines of the 
traditional kingdoms of the region.  The Buganda kingdom would highly benefit from 
this system, as it is the best-organized and most populous kingdom in Uganda. However, 
precisely because it is the best-organized and most populous traditional kingdom in 
Uganda the central government fears the impacts the involvement of the Kabaka (king of 
Buganda kingdom) could have on its power. This tension has created a delicate balance 
for the government in managing its political relationship with the Buganda kingdom. Any 
                                                
61Thomas F. Ofcansky, Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996): 13-39.  
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sign of power shifting away from the government triggers a repressive response from the 
central government.  
In 2009 the Kabaka planned to preside over a Buganda youth festival being held 
in Kayunga. The disapproval of a local Museveni appointed chief sparked internal strife 
between the local chief and the Kabaka. Despite the disapproval and the strife it created 
within the Kingdom the Kabaka decided to go ahead with the planned event. This 
decision prompted the local community in Kayunga to petition the Buganda Parliament to 
secede from the Kingdom. In connection with this petition some elements of the local 
community continued to demonstrate against the Kabaka’s visit. Unmoved by the protests 
the Kabaka’s office determined that the event would go ahead as planned.  In accordance 
with the event-planning schedule the Kabaka’s advanced preparation team began local 
preparations for the festival, which caused further demonstrations. Amidst these internal 
kingdom protests the central government misread the protests as something larger than an 
internal dispute. This misreading of the protests led police to begin firing teargas on the 
Kabaka’s advanced team and other protestors in the area. The government’s actions 
united the Buganda youth against the central government.  
On September 10th the Katikiro (equivalent of prime minster) and other ministers 
of the Kingdom attempted to visit Kayunga to oversee preparations for the festival. As 
they attempted to enter the region police forces barred them from entering the region on 
the grounds that the visit would promote further instability and that it was unsafe. Once 
news of this action spread anti-government protests and riots erupted throughout 
Kampala and the suburbs. These protests were a sign that the possibility of power shifting 
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towards social identities and away from the regime. In response to these protests 
government forces moved quickly to quell the protests using teargas and other violent 
measures. The government also forced the silence of the Buganda Kingdom’s radio 
station, the Central Broadcasting Service (CBS), for inciting violence in Kampala and 
throughout Buganda Kingdom. All told over a four-day span of protests four people were 
killed and scores injured.  
2010 Kasubi Tombs Burning 
Several months after the Kayunga protests on the morning of March 16, 2010 the 
Kasubi Tombs, which were the ceremonial burial grounds of several previous Kabakas, 
were burned to the ground. Originally it was unclear what the cause of the fire was and 
some suspected the government of involvement in burning the tombs.62 The following 
day the current Kabaka visited the tombs with President Museveni. Large numbers 
Bagandan youth demonstrated against the President’s visit and attempted to block him 
from entering the area. In an effort to curb the protests and allow the president’s visit to 
occur police fired lived ammunition into the crowds killing three people. Again this was a 
clear attempt by the Bugandan youth to organize against political authorities in order to 
influence government actions. Thus, the government moved to stop power moving away 
from the regime.  
While this event did not turn into more than an isolated incident, tensions 
remained high throughout Kampala for several days. One Kampala resident remarked, “it 
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was as if the country would explode into a civil war.”63 Unlike the protests seven months 
earlier the central government did not move to institutionally repress civil rights by 
restricting constitutionally protected acts. However, the use of live ammunition to 
disperse protests at an important Buganda cultural site illustrates the ready nature of the 
Museveni government to employ violence to repress civil rights. Employing force to 
curtail these civil rights undermines any citizen attempts to check runaway political 
power, since they lack the capabilities of violence necessary to check the military power 
of state.  
2011 Walk-to-Work Protests 
The 2011 walk-to-work protests continued to demonstrate political authorities’ 
use of institutional and violent repression against any societal attempts to shift power 
away from the government. While the protests began in mid-April 2011 the events in the 
months preceding the protests help establish the context. In late February 2011 Uganda 
held parliamentary and presidential elections with Museveni running for a fourth five-
year term against several opposition candidates. The general sentiment previous to the 
election was that Museveni was going to face his closest election decision since the 
resumption of elections in 1995; however, Museveni ended up winning in a landslide 
fashion securing 68% of the vote.64The opposition candidates immediately decried the 
elections as illegitimate charging the regime with vote rigging and buying. From this 
context of a landslide, but deeply flawed, victory the protests developed. 
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52 
In a rare demonstration of opposition solidarity, the opposition candidates 
uniformly called for protests65. In fear of widespread protests, similar to those sweeping 
over North Africa and the Middle East at the time, the government banned all public 
demonstrations and took other measures to ensure any protests would not get out of 
hand.66 Despite the feverish nature of the call for protests none materialized and the 
government seemed to stave off any attempts to check its growing political power. 
This uneasy aftermath of the election continued until late March 2011. Amidst 
rising worldwide oil and commodity prices Ugandans began to face a steep rise in the 
cost of living. The opposition used this steep rise as a rallying cry forsocial identities to 
join them in walking to work as a means of protest over the high prices. The main 
demand of the protests was for the government to cut the tax rate on fuel, which stood at 
roughly Sh850 per liter of fuel.67 Many social identities throughout the country joined the 
opposition in walking to work on April 11th.68 These protests were attempts to acquire 
citizen power and to influence the course of government decisions and become active 
participants in the political process. While initially a peaceful protest against rising fuel 
and food prices the movement quickly turned violent as the regime moved to curb social 
identities’ attempts to organize.  
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67 This tax represents roughly one-fourth to one-third the price of a liter of fuel depending on the total price 
per liter. In other words the price would be substantively lower if the government decided to eliminate the 
tax, even temporarily.  
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For example shortly after leaving their homes police stopped opposition 
authorities Kizza Besigye (from the south) and Norbert Mao (from the north) in their 
attempts to walk to work. The police argued that these individuals were illegally 
demonstrating against the government and had not properly notified the police of their 
intentions. Their detainments reshaped the protests from protests against inflationary 
pressures to anti-government protests throughout the country. It should be noted that 
these demonstrations were not confined to any ethnic sub region, but rather were 
nationwide. While not marching side by side, both northern and southern ethnic groups 
demonstrated against the government’s repressive response and its unwillingness to 
combat inflationary pressures. This national response demonstrates some possible 
underlying common interests from which society can leverage to bridge its north/south 
ethnic divide. 
Not only were the protests nationwide, but also the government’s response was 
much the same in all regions of the country. The government’s response was to fire tear 
gas and rubber bullets into crowds. In one instance during this initial response Kizza 
Besigye was hit in the hand by a rubber bullet, breaking one of his fingers. Other similar 
instances of violence occurred in northern Uganda. After several days of formal protests 
and several arrests, the Rapid Response Unit (a plain clothed Museveni supporting 
militia) was deployed against Besigye and violently arrested the opposition 
leader.69Despite this violence protests continued. After a few days of protests the army 
and military police were called in to restore order and dispel protestors. While the police 
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fired rubber bullets and tear gas the army and military police used live ammunition 
resulting in the death of at least four individuals including a two-and-a-half year old 
girl.70 At this point it was clear that the government cared nothing for bridging ethnic 
divisions, but rather maintaining its systemic power. 
Concurrent to this violent response from the government, the government also 
institutionally represses constitutional rights via decree. In the beginning of the protests 
the government announced a ban on live coverage of the protests: no media outlet was 
allowed to produce live videos or pictures of the protests.71 The government stated that it 
did not want the media to incite the country to violence over the protest. This banning of 
live coverage of the demonstrations has now become the basis for proposed legislation in 
parliament to ban live coverage of all future protests and demonstrations.72 Again the 
reason given is the need to avoid the media inciting violence throughout the country. One 
must ask however why the government would ban live media coverage of a peaceful 
protest over the cost of fuel? 
Clearly, the regime feels threatened by the demonstrations and the potential 
delegitimizing nature they possessed. It was clear from these protests that social identities 
were seeking to directly influence the course of government policy, and thus acquire 
power within the system. Their acquisition of power would have directly decreased the 
regime ability to maintain its systemic power. Facing these threats to its power the 
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government responded to maintain its power. Thus again, political authorities 
demonstrated that their primary interest is not to reconstruct structural power in society, 
but rather to maintain its own power in society at all costs.  
Conclusion 
 These three examples illustrate the way in which the Museveni regime has 
resorted to violence and institutional repression in order to maintain systemic power. 
While defending its actions under the guise of maintaining stability, which would bring 
about prosperity, political authorities have institutionally oppressed civil rights and killed 
many social identities.73 Closing the CBS radio station due to their alleged incitement of 
violence during the 2009 Kayunga riots, the banning of protests during the 2011 Walk-to-
Work protests, and the banning of live coverage of demonstrations are examples of the 
way political authorities used institutional means to repress social identities. In each case 
the government curtailed the freedom of speech and association by governmental decree.  
The constitution of Uganda enshrines these rights by stating: “every person shall have the 
right to freedom of speech and expression which shall include the press and other 
media…[and] freedom to assemble and to demonstrate together with others peacefully 
and unarmed to petition.”74 Both of these freedoms are critical to maintaining a truly 
stable society. Furthermore, the violent responses during all three incidents are typical of 
how the Museveni government has used violence to repress social identities.75
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CHAPTER THREE: CONSEQUENCES OF MUSEVENI’S EXTENDED TENURE 
The previous chapter argued that Museveni and his government have focused on 
maintaining power in Uganda society through patronage and repression. The government 
has continually argued that the reason for its actions is to promote stability, which would 
then lead to economic and national development.76 The chapter further argued that the 
government’s actions demonstrated its primary interest of maintaining systemic power 
over reconstructing the structural distribution of societal power. By maintaining its own 
systemic power, political authorities had several effects on the society in regards to 
economic and national development. This chapter will now review some of the positive 
and negative consequences of the government’s choice to pursue its own power 
maintenance over reconstructing structural power. In other words, what have been the 
actual positive and negative effects of the Museveni government on Ugandan society in 
relation to economic and national development?  
Positive Consequences 
Relative macroeconomic stability and increased national development are the 
main positive consequences of the Museveni’s decision to pursue the maintenance of his 
systemic power. While political patronage and repression do have severe negative 
consequences for any state some minimal efficiencies are gained through an authoritarian 
system. Specifically, the ability to focus the national government on a narrow range of 
priorities has allowed the Museveni government to bring about the aforementioned 
positive changes in Ugandan society. Despite these efficiencies and positive benefits 
                                                




flowing from the distinct north/south ethnic divide continues to play prominently in many 
aspects of these positive consequences. The negative aspects associated with this 
north/south divide continue to allow political authorities to further maintain systemic 
power.   
Macroeconomic Climate 
Inflation 
Inflationary pressures can stifle the growth of any economy and create a tinderbox 
of political dissent among various social identities. Inflation under the Museveni regime 
has remained relatively stable year over year and has decreased since the regime came to 
power. Chart 1 illustrates inflation in Uganda since 1980 as measured in the percent 
change in consumer prices year over year. Inflation was on a runaway trajectory prior to 
Museveni’s consolidation of power and was anything but stable or predictable. Once 
inflation was brought under control around 1992-93 the inflation rate in Uganda has been 
an average of 7.4%.77 While 7.4% is relatively high, inflationary stability has existed 
since the government came to power.  
                                                






Chart 1. Inflation in Uganda since 1980, Consumer Prices (Annual %)78
 
 
 This inflationary stability is critical for ordinary Ugandans. While the government 
and Ugandans certainly would like more moderate inflation expectations year over year, 
the very fact that the inflation rate has hovered around 7-8% per year signals to 
consumers and investors what they can expect in the marketplace in the following months 
and year. In other words, while prices have continued to rise in Uganda under the current 
government, these rises have been fairly predictable; thus allowing the state and its social 
identities to plan for expenses from month to month and year to year. This predictability 
within the macroeconomic situation gives the country a sense of calm amidst rising 
prices.  
International Trade Statistics  
Stability in international trade is a key determinant of the overall stability of a 
country’s macroeconomic environment. In a country with a stable macroeconomic 
                                                

































































































environment one would expect to see relatively the same current account and capital 
account balances year over year. While slight variations will exist depending on the 
overall health and structure of the world economy, one would expect the current accounts 
and capital accounts to be relatively stable if a country is pursuing a coherent trading 
strategy.  Since Museveni’s consolidation of power this is what we see in Uganda. What 
we also see from both the current and capital account charts (Chart 2-3) is that there are 
no large swings in either direction, positive or negative (with the exception of 1993 and 
2006 in the capital account) in either the capital or current accounts. This reveals that 
countries are viewing the Ugandan state as a viable trading partner: they are not worried 
about violent changes in the macroeconomic situation of the country that would make 
trade or investment unprofitable. 
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Chart 3. Capital Account Balance since 1993 (BoP, current US $)80 
 
International Investment 
Stable inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) are another indicator of an 
improved macroeconomic climate during the Museveni era (see Chart 4). Previous to the 
NRM’s consolidation of power in 1986 very little FDI flowed into Uganda. Obote’s 
“Charter of the Common Man”, the subsequent policy shift towards more socialist 
leaning policies, and Amin’s expulsion of Asian’s and expropriation of their property left 
many foreign companies and investors leery of doing business in Uganda. While by no 
means perfect today, steps have been taken to assure the international business 
community that Uganda is a safe place to invest and do business under the current 
government.81 This steady inflow of FDI has contributed to the overall improvement of 
the economic situation of most Ugandan’s under the Museveni regime. However, there is 
a distinct north/south aspect to these improvements.  
                                                
80 World Bank, “World Development Indicators Database 1960-2009”. 
81 Much of these steps have occurred under the liberalization policies pursued during the 1990’s. Given this 
nature of liberalization there have been no real threats of expropriation or any other harmful investment 












Chart 4. Foreign Direct Investment in Uganda since 1980 (net inflows % of GDP)82 
 
National Income 
In monetary terms Uganda, as a whole, has experienced rapid development gains 
over the past 25 years. Chart 5 illustrates the growth in total GDP since 1986. The table 
reveals that in 1986 the GDP was roughly $4 billion and in 2009 the GDP was just below 
$16 billion. This nearly fourfold increase in total GDP has been driven by an annual 
growth rate of 6.5% between 1986-2009. Furthermore, this growth in GDP has translated 
in the growth in GDP/capita as evidenced in Chart 6. In 1986 GDP/capita was a little 
over $250 and in 2009 it was $490. What these two charts do not show is the dramatic 
differences in income between the northern and southern regions of the country. The 
difference between the amounts of individuals living below the poverty line in the north 
compared to the south in staggering (Table 3). While the government has made good 
progress fighting poverty in the north this income disparity is a driver of ethnic tension in 
the country. Many northerners see this disparity as a result of policies the Museveni 
government has pursued that are specifically favoring the southern region over the north. 
                                                























































































































Chart 6. Ugandan GDP/capita 1986-2009 (Current US $)84 
 
 
Table 3. Poverty Headcount Ratio (% of total population) in Uganda, by region.85 
Region 1992/93 1997 1999/00 2002/03 2005/06 
Central 45.6 27.9 19.7 22.3 16.4 
Eastern 58.8 54.3 35.0 46.0 35.9 
Northern 72.2 60.9 63.6 63.3 60.7 
Western 53.1 42.8 26.2 31.4 20.5 
                                                
83 W World Bank, “World Development Indicators Database 1960-2009”. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Theophane Nikyema, Millennium Development Goals: Uganda’s Progress Report, 2007 (United 



































































































Since Museveni’s ascendency and consolidation of power Uganda has 
experienced consistent national development across many segments of society. 
Specifically, Uganda has experienced large increases in the receipt of international donor 
support and in leveraging this donor support towards gains in human capital 
development. Each of these sectors has been important to the overall development of the 
Ugandan economy. The national government hopes to continue to build on these previous 
gains and transform Uganda from a traditional society to a modern one in within thirty 
years.86 In order to accomplish this task the government must focus on leveraging the 
gains previously experienced in order to generate further advances in economic 
development.  
International Funding Gains 
 Museveni’s government has used international donor support as a key pillar in its 
overall economic development strategy since coming to power in 1986. The government 
close relationship with the World Bank exemplifies this ability to attract international 
funding. The regime’s active courting of this aid support has contributed towards to 
overall economic development in Uganda since 1986.87 However, this active courting has 
not been without ulterior motives. Despite the positive benefits have occurred as a result 
of this funding political authorities have used this relationship as another mechanism to 
maintain societal power. 
                                                
86 The Republic of Uganda, National Development Plan 2010/11-2014/15, (Kampala: Government of 
Uganda, April 2010), 1. 
87 William Easterly, “Can Aid Buy Growth,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 167 no. 3 
(Summer, 2003): 36. 
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 Table 3 outlines the number of World Bank projects during the four major 
administrations of Uganda’s post-independence political history. The average number of 
projects per year under Milton Obote, including both tenures, is roughly 2.5 projects per 
year. Under Amin the average was less than one project per year and the majority (4 out 
of 5) of the projects were in some way related to the East African regional integration 
scheme. Under Museveni, Uganda has received an average of 5.3 projects per year. 
While some of these projects are relatively localized projects most deal with the national 
economy as a whole. These national level projects characterize the top down 
development strategy the government has employed since 1986. Securing these projects 
has brought the regime legitimacy among some portions of society. This legitimacy 
translates directly into increased political power. Therefore this relationship with the 
World Bank is another mechanism the government is using to acquire systemic power.  
Table 3. Number of World Bank Projects by Major Administration88 
Administration (Years) Number of Projects 
Obote I (1962-1971) 16 
Amin (1971-1979) 5 
Obote II (1980-1985) 16 
Museveni (1986-Present) 132 
 
 Table 4 charts the total amount of loans received from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association 
                                                





(IDA). Both agencies are part of the World Bank Group.89The loan amounts trended 
steadily upward prior to the 1986 power transition. However, this upward trend alone 
does not account for the increase in average amounts received under the Museveni 
regime. Since 1990 Uganda has received nearly $1 billion dollars in assistance from the 
IBRD and IDA each year and as the table indicates an average of nearly $1.6 billion 
dollars a year since 1986. These loans and credits have dramatically strengthened the 
power of political authorities as they have given legitimacy to Museveni and others who 
have been able to secure these funds for the country. Thus, the government can claim 
(albeit probably falsely so) that its presence is necessary for further international funding. 
Regardless of the validity of their claims in this regard, political authorities continue to 
make them and increase in attempts leverage over society.  
Table 4. Average Yearly IBRD Loans and IDA Credits (Current US $)90 
Administration (Years) Average Amount 
Obote I (1962-1971) No data 
Amin (1971-1979) 41,076,222 
Obote II (1980-1985) 143,045,833 
Museveni (1986-Present) 1,597,053,667 
 
Human Capital Gains 
 Measuring gains in human capital are difficult due to constraints on the 
quantifiability of these measures. However, it is not impossible. Any measures that can 
quantify greater capabilities of individuals can proxy for gains in human capital.  These 
                                                
89 The difference between them is that IBRD loans are given at prevailing market rates and IDA credits are 
loans given at concessional rates. 
90 World Bank, “World Development Indicators Database 1960-2009”. 
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gains involve increasing the capabilities of individuals in order to allow them to have the 
greater agency. This involves educational training, health, longevity, and so forth. While 
these areas do create more self-confidence, leveraging these gains towards personal 
economic development is contingent on the broader economy. In other words, an 
individual can experience gains in their personal human capital stock, but without the 
opportunities to put these gains to use in the broader economy they cannot tangibly 
extract benefits; people needs jobs to translate human capital gains into the benefits 
associated with a higher standard of living. While the monetary gains in Uganda are 
significant and have contributed to a higher quality of life for Uganda’s under Museveni, 
gains in human capital have not translated as tangibly to a higher quality of life. 
 Several statistics reveal in what areas these human capital gains are occurring.   
Table 6 charts the percentage of Ugandans living to age 65 since 1998. A greater 
percentage of a cohort population suggests at least two human capital gains. First, the 
population as a whole has greater access to nutrition. When a population has access to a 
more nutritious diet, they will naturally live longer. Second, the population has greater 
access to health care services. Without this greater access it would not be possible to 
overcome the disease burden a population encounters throughout its life cycle. Simply, 







Table 6. Percentage of Population Cohort Living to Age 65.91 
Year Male Female 
1998 35 29 
1999 35 30 
2000 36 31 
2001 36 33 
2002 37 34 
2003 38 35 
2004 39 37 
2005 41 38 
2006 42 40 
2007 44 42 
2008 45 43 
  
  Tables 7-9 illustrates the progress the governmentis making in educating its 
population. Recently the government has made the education of its population a priority. 
In line with this priority the government has consistently devoted roughly twenty percent 
of its government expenditures to education. Table 8 shows what impact this is having on 
the number of children that progress from primary school to secondary school. The 
amount of students progressing onto secondary school has nearly doubled since 1995. 
While this does have the potential to cause societal conflicts once these students graduate 
and find it difficult to contract employment, increasing the amount of education 
individuals receive is a positive step for Uganda. It also directly increases its human 
capital stock.  
Table 9 further illustrates the gains Uganda has made in educating its social 
identities. When contextualized the decrease in per student expenditure that this table 
demonstrates actually reveals some positive gains. The government has kept public 
spending on education constant. The decrease in per student expenditure measured as a 
                                                
91 World Bank, “World Development Indicators Database 1960-2009”. 
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percentage of GDP/capita reveals that more students are attending school at each age 
level.  Again this increased attendance facilitates gains in the human capital stock in 
Uganda.  
 





















Table 9. Expenditure per student by age level (% of GDP per capita)94 
Age level 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Primary 10.68 .. .. .. 8.48 
Secondary 32.17 .. .. .. 27.05 
Tertiary 178.83 .. .. .. 121.07 
 
 While these gains have been positive for the entire society, these gains in human 
capital are not evenly dispersed between northern and southern Uganda. One statistic 
reveals these disparities clearly. The net primary school enrollment by region between 
                                                





1992/1992 and 2002/2003 is significantly lower in the northern region than in any other 
region of the country (Table 10).Here is another instance of a distinct north/south divide 
of the benefits under Museveni. These disparities represent the same forms of neglect 
seen previously in relation to income disparities. The government has not pursued, or 
worse ignored, the development of human capital in the north. As with the other instances 
of neglect one must begin to question the sincerity of political authorities attempts to 
facilitate national development. More and more these attempts become actions to acquire 
societal power. Neglecting the north in this manner creates further dependencies from 
which political authorities can acquire greater political power 
Table 10. Net Primary School Enrollment by Region.95 
Region Girls 2005 2006 2007 
 1992/93 2002/03 1992/93 2002/03 
Central 69.1 85.3 69.0 85.1 
Eastern 62.0 89.7 66.7 89.4 
Northern 29.7 72.5 55.4 73.5 
Western 60.4 88.0 62.3 84.3 
 
Negative Consequences 
The Militarization of Uganda 
Uganda has always had a militaristic strain running through its political culture. 
The Museveni tenure has only served to strengthen this aspect of political life in Uganda. 
This strengthening gives the government greater power as they possess the means of 
                                                
95 Table and figures from Kate Higgins, Regional Inequality and Primary Education in Northern Uganda, 
Policy Brief No. 2, Overseas Development Institute (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2007):5, 
downloaded at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2504.pdf (accessed 20 August 2011). The chart 
is disaggregated into the four main regions of Uganda. Higgins notes that the wider northern region, of 
which I am primarily referring to throughout this thesis, composes both the sub-regions within the northern 
and eastern regions of Uganda. When this wider north construct is used the statistics still reveal a particular 
level of neglect. The net school enrollment for girls in 2002/03 is 81.1% in the wider north and 86.6 in the 
south. For boys the rate is 81.45 in the north and 84.7 in the south. 
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military violence. Museveni’s personal background as the military leader of the NRA 
only bolsters his own perceptions of the necessity of military power in governmental 
leadership positions. To Museveni his military credentials are some of his strongest 
qualities.96 This growing militarization can be most clearly seen in the growth in the size 
and capability of the army, the rise in military expenditure under the regime and the 
growth of private regime supported militias. While the militarization of Uganda can 
easily by seen empirically, it is the role militarization continues to play in society that is 
most disturbing.  
 The first place from which to view this militarization is with the central 
government expenditures. When measured in terms of the overall percentage of 
government expenditure and spending as a percentage of GDP, the regime has kept 
military spending relatively stable at around 14% of total government expenditure and 
2.4% of GDP. While this does not seem to be particularly alarming recall that Uganda 
has experienced a near quadrupling of their national economy under the Museveni 
regime. One would expect that the spending relative to total expenditure and GDP of a 
non-militaristic regime would decrease over this economic growth. The stability of 
spending under the regime signals its militaristic nature. Furthermore,the actual spending 
on military expenditure (measured in local currency units) reveals a fuller picture of the 
regime’s activities.  
                                                
96 Museveni recently stated his desire to be buried in his military uniform. By choosing this over another 
form of burial clothing Museveni signals that his allegiance to the military and his former military life 
defines him as a leader. This is particularly clear when one recalls that Museveni had little formal military 
training that would qualify him for service as a military office, but rather he self-appointed himself as such. 
See Anne Mugisa, “I Wont Allow Distuption – Museveni,” New Vision May 31, 2011, at 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/756296 (accessed 23 July 2011) for the story. 
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The regime spending on military has increased faster than inflation every year 
since 1993 except between 2008-9. What this reveals is that the regime is using economic 
growth partially as a cover to hide the growing militarization in Uganda. Frankly, the 
regime hides its military expenditure growth behind stable expenditures relative to 
overall expenditure and GDP. Table 10 bears this out more clearly as total real 
expenditure is compared against what expenditure would hypothetically look like if 
spending only grew with inflation.This increased spending has translated into steady 
gains in both numbers of military personnel and in military equipment.97 
Table 10. Real Amount of Military Expenditure98 






1993 74,852,000,000  
1994 101,987,000,000 79,642,528,000 
1995 123,055,000,000 108,514,168,000 
1996 141,632,000,000 130,930,520,000 
1997 151,206,000,000 150,696,448,000 
1998 191,892,000,000 160,883,184,000 
1999 232,343,000,000 204,173,088,000 
2000 232,370,000,000 247,212,952,000 
2001 239,046,000,000 247,241,680,000 
2002 255,597,000,000 254,344,944,000 
2003 299,232,000,000 271,955,208,000 
2004 354,848,000,000 318,382,848,000 
2005 385,813,000,000 377,558,272,000 
2006 400,234,000,000 410,505,032,000 
                                                
97 The publication Military Balance states  that Uganda had roughly 6000 regular troops and very little high 
quality military equipment (International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1986-1987. 
London: The Institute, 1986). The 2011 edition of the same publication stated that the Uganda now has 
roughly 40000-45000, a substantive air force and a formidable arsenal of semi modern military equipment. 
Uganda has substantially upgraded their numerical size and weapons capabilities during the Museveni era.  
98 World Bank, “World Development Indicators Database 1960-2009”. 
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2007 478,150,000,000 425,848,976,000 
2008 640,500,000,000 508,751,600,000 
2009 662,500,000,000  
 
 Concurrent to the growth both in size and strength of Uganda’s military the 
regime has utilized various paramilitary and security service organizations to ‘maintain 
order’. Table 11 gives a list of these groups, their primary function and the year the group 
was organized. This development is clearly alarming. 
Table 11. Paramilitary and Security Groups in Uganda. 
Organization Name Primary Function for Regime 
Approximate Year 
Organized 
Kiboko Squad Harass Political Opponents99 2007 
Citizens Concerned Pre-Election Mobilization100 ~2001 
Boda-Boda Association Intelligence Gathering101  
The Kalanga Action Plan 




The Oil Wells Protection 
Unit 
Physical Security for Oil 
Interests/Intelligence 
Gathering in Oil Area105 
 
Violent Crime Crack Unit 
(VCCU) Crime Fighting
106 2003107 
                                                
99 Independent Team, “Kiboko Squad Revealed,” The Independent, September 15, 2009 
http://www.independent. co.ugindex.php/cover-story/cover-story/82-cover-story/1769-kiboko-squad-
revealed, (accessed 6 June 2011). 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Tripp, 138. 
103 Human Rights Watch, State of Pain: Torture in Uganda, 20 
104 Independent Team, September 15, 2009. 
105 Ibid. 
106 HRW State of Pain: Torture in Uganda, 21 
107 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Accountability in 
Uganda, (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative: New Delhi, Inida, 2006), 14. 
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Presidential Guard Brigade Museveni Praetorian Guard108 2003 
Black Mamba Squad Anti-Terrorism Group/Harass Opponents109 2005
110 
Joint Anti-Terrorism Task 
Force 
Fighting the Lord’s 
Resistance Army 2002
111 
Rapid Response Unit 




Chieftaincy of Military 
Intelligence 
Intelligence Gathering/114 
Extrajudicial Killing115  
 
 As an example of the behavior and utilization of these militias one of them, the 
Kiboko squad, will be briefly discussed. While, the government does not ‘formally’ 
employ them, or any of the other informal security groups there is a little doubt among 
Ugandans what is really taking place.116 These judgments are not based solely on a 
distrust of Museveni or on unfounded conspiracies; rather, militia authorities often slip as 
to where their groups receive support and for what causes. For example, one Kiboko 
squad member told a foreign journalist that their infamous sticks used to break up 
demonstrations and riots were kept in an underground room in the Central Kampala 
                                                
108 Tripp, 137. 
109 Gunrun Dewey, “A Reflection on Real Security for Uganda,” Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 
vol. 14 no 1 (Spring 2007). 
110 Independent Team, September 15. 2009 
111 Jemera Rone, “State of Pain: Torture in Uganda”, Human Rights Watch vol. 16 no. 4 (March, 2004): 20. 
112 Human Rights Watch, Violence Instead of Vigilance: Torture and Illegal Detention by Uganda’s Reapid 
Response Unit, (March 2011), 18. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Tripp, 138. 
115 Uganda: Security Force Executions Exposed, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/10/02/uganda-security-
force-executions-reported (accessed 6 June 2011) 
116 Allan Tacca, “Can Kiboko Ruffians Save NRM From the Citizen,” Sunday Monitor July 4, 2010, 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/OpEdColumnists/AllanTacca/-/878694/951524/-/u6j07jz/-/index.html 
(accessed 20 July 2010). A quick perusal of local papers demonstrates the citizen’s recognition of the 
regime’s involvement in the creation and funding of the militias. The above author’s article is exemplitive 
of many others. He wrote: “One of President Museveni’s dilemmas must be how to continue to unleashing 
the men in army uniform to clobber and silence unarmed civilians without tarnishing the image of the 
uniformed soldier. Enter the Kiboko squad.”  
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Police Station.117 Another said that they were told not to beat up opposition authorities 
but “small people”.118 Officially, the regime claims that the Kiboko militias, and others 
like them, are only a “community who organized themselves in a self-defense group 
against rioters.”119 However, one Kiboko member discounts Museveni’s statement about 
the local nature of the militia. Following the Kiboko’s break-up of a demonstration at the 
Clock Tower in Kampala this member said: “Everything has an owner. Uganda is owned 
by President Museveni, so we shall fight to protect him in power.”120This disturbing 
allegiance directly to the president represents the sentiments of many of these private 
militias. 
This militarization of Uganda has several negative impacts on Uganda. First, the 
ability of the regime to create multiple ‘private’ militias to enforce its interests 
throughout the country is problematic to social identities seeking to check runaway 
political power. Second, the growing militarization of society is another example of the 
way in which the Museveni government has sought to acquire systemic power in order to 
pursue its interest. This movement to acquire systemic power via force signals to the rest 
of society the political authorities’ desire to retrench their systemic power at all costs. 
Lastly, an ethnic dimension surrounds these militaristic tendencies. The majority of these 
militia groups originates from and operates within the southern half of the country. This 
continues the trend of Uganda’s political authorities shaping military power from their 
general ethnic region. Obote and Amin both did this and now Museveni is doing the 
                                                
117 Independent Team, September 15, 2009. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Rodney Muhumuza, “Who Are the Face Behind Kiboko Squad,” Daily Monitor, June 26, 2010 




same. The lack of ethnic diversity within these groups is another sign of political 
authorities’ intentions to hold onto systemic power by any means necessary. The general 
exclusion of northern ethnic groups from this militarization of society strengthens the 
government’s ethnic base, thus further dividing Ugandan society along ethnic lines.  
Decreasing National Unity 
 Despite its attempts to achieve national unity through its broad based governance 
approach, the government has failed to unify the country through the development of 
political cohesion. The reasons for this have been argued above, but the conflicting 
patronage system, repression and the unequal distribution of development gains have 
dramatically hindered Museveni’s attempts at creating national unity. The clearest 
evidence of this can be found in the election returns since the reintroduction of elections 
in 1995.121 This reintroduction of elections was the result of both international pressure 
and an internal government motivation for electoral legitimacy, which was critical in 
moving forward and to staying in power for longer. The inability to manufacture national 
unity has hindered the reconstruction of power within society. Furthermore, the hijacking 
of electoral legitimacy has served to retrench political power, and the political authorities 
who hold it, as the dominant power in Ugandan society.  
 During the first election in 1996 the NRM and Museveni won with a large 
percentage of the national vote (see Table 12). While the election was a landslide in favor 
of Museveni this election is largely believed to represent the will of the people 
throughout the entire country. This election was the first sign of an emerging national 
                                                
121 These elections are good evidence of this decreasing national unity as the major players have stayed 
essentially the same in all elections. Because the major players have remained the same the ethnic 
north/south divide becomes irrelevant in determining national unity. 
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identity and consensus apart from ethnic division. Despite the presence of multiple 
candidates in the first election under the NRM, all candidates were from the NRM and 
failed to represent a viable difference to Museveni’s candidacy. The inclusion of only 
NRM candidates for presidential office effectively allowed Museveni to run unopposed. 
Nonetheless, the results of this election do show Museveni’s popularity and the potential 
for leveraging that potential towards the creation of national unity.  
Table 12. 1996 Presidential Election Results.122 
Candidate Votes Received Percentage 
Yoweri Museveni 4,458,195 74.3 
Paul Ssemogerere 1,416,140 23.6 
 
 Six years later cracks began emerging in national support for the regime. 
Following his fallout with Museveni, Dr. Kizza Besigye, broke with the NRM party line 
and decided to run for the presidency against Musevni. Accusing Museveni and the 
regime from deviating from a truly democratic environment Besigye garnered 27.7 % of 
the vote in the 2001 elections (see Table 13). It is during this election that cracks in 
nascent national unity began to percolate only to boil over during the 2006 elections. 
Besigye’s candidacy represented the opportunity to demonstratively signal collective 
frustrations to the government concerning corruption and general dismay. Following this 




                                                
122 Electoral Commission, Ugandan Presidential Elections 9 May 1996, Final Results  (Kampala: 
Government of Uganda) at http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/Nat_Res_1996.pdf (accessed 22 July 2011). 
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Table 13. 2001 Presidential Election Results123 
Candidate Votes Received Percentage 
Kizza Besigye 2,029,190 27.7 
Yoweri Museveni 5,088,470 69.4 
 
 Intimidation and violence towards Besigye and his colleagues marred the 2006 
elections.124 The arrests and intimidation of Besigye illustrated the fear the government 
felt that Besigye represented to the continuation of the Museveni tenure. As Table 14 
shows Besigye garnered 37.39% of the vote to Museveni’s 59.26%. Museveni and the 
regime had clearly begun to lose legitimacy among large sections of the country. While 
the rise of a challenger candidate and opposition parties does not necessarily illustrate a 
decrease in national unity they do illustrate the growing sense that the Museveni regime 
was beginning to develop runaway political power. Furthermore, the polarizing rhetoric 
of Museveni and his regime against Besigye, and the larger opposition that he represents, 
is beginning to decrease the possibility of any sense of national unity or identity forming 
under Museveni. This became dramatically clear during the 2011 election and its 
aftermath.  
Table 14. 2006 Presidential Election Results125 
Candidate Votes Received Percentage 
Kizza Besigye 2,592,954 37.39 
Yoweri Museveni 4,109,449 59.26 
 
                                                
123 Electoral Commission, Uganda Presidential Elections March 2001, Summary Results Sheet by District,  
(Kampala: Government of Uganda) at http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/Dist_Sum_2001.pdf (accessed 22 
July 2011). 
124 For a description of the level of this violence the personal account of Besigye’s sister is helpful. It can 
be found in the following work: Olive Kobunsingye, The Correct Line?,(Author House: Central Milton 
Keynes, UK: 2010). 
125 Electoral Commission, Presidential Elections, 2006 Results Tally Sheet (Kampala: Government of 
Uganda) at http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/2006_pres_polling.pdf (accessed 22 July 2011). 
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The 2011 election cycle in Uganda was highly contested. In the months leading 
up to the election both Museveni and Besigye canvassed the country for support. Large 
turnouts for Besigye revealed the growing discontent with the Museveni regime. It was 
clear that the growing support of Besigye and coherence within the opposition movement 
was a threat to the systemic power of political authorities. Table 15 reveals the election 
results. Museveni won the election by the largest margin since the 1996 elections. This 
was not a signal of increased support for the regime, but rather a more concerted effort a 
vote rigging and buying.126 This concerted effort dramatically skewed the vote in 
Museveni’s favor. While the exact level of skewing may never be known, the aftermath 
of the elections clearly demonstrate a growing lack of national unity around Museveni.  
Table 15. 2011 Presidential Election Results127 
Candidate Votes Received Percentage 
Kizza Besigye 2,064,963 26.01 
Yoweri Museveni 5,428,369 68.38 
 
Also, the regimes actions during the 2011 election season further demonstrated 
the lengths to which the regime would go to maintain its own power in society. Several 
months after the elections the Walk-to-Work protests began. As previously discussed 
these protests began as demonstrations against high food and fuel prices; however 
following the arrests of Besigye and other opposition leader the protests transformed into 
anti-government riots. The riots lasted for several days on end before subsiding and 
reigniting several days later. The regime has lost legitimacy with some parts of the 
general population, but certain portions continue to support the regime. The lack of a 
                                                
126 Angelo Izama, “Uganda: Museveni’s Triumph and Weakness”, Journal of Democracy vol. 22 no. 3 
(July, 2011): 68. 
127 Electoral Commission, Presidential Elections, Feburary 2011 District Tally Sheet (Kampala: 
Government of Uganda) at http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/2011_Pres_dis.pdf (accessed 22 July 2011). 
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truly competitive democracy in Uganda is causing national unity to decrease within the 
country, with some worried openly about civil war during times of tension.128 The 
presence of a growingly coherent political opposition does not itself portend national 
disunity, but the regime’s reaction and that of its supporters does. What should be of 
concern to those in society is the continued centralization of political power in Museveni.  
The Institutionalization of Personal Rule 
The final consequence and perhaps one of the most troubling consequences, yet 
least quantifiable, of Musveni’s rule on Ugandan politics is the institutionalization of 
personal rule. It is not just that Museveni is an archetypal charismatic leader, as per 
Weber129, that is the main negative consequence, but rather it is the enacting of laws that 
center large amounts of political power with the president via the ability to appoint many 
key government positions throughout the country. For all of its corruption and human 
rights abuses the Museveni regime has facilitated some positive changes in Uganda as a 
result of their political foresight and action. That said, what happens when Museveni 
chooses his successor and his foresight or political ability fall short? With institutional 
power centered within the president the country could soon digress towards dictatorial 
rule.  
Several scholars have noted this trend beginning to take place in Ugandan society. 
Andrew Mwenda argues that the personalization of power is taking place across several 
arenas of government, but all centered on reshaping the constitutional powers of the 
                                                
128 Interview with author, April 9, 2010, Kampala, Uganda.  
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president towards more personal rule.130 And Tripp argues that the reshaping of 
constitutional powers, specifically the elimination of presidential term limits, was the 
“quid quo pro of political liberalization”131 in Uganda politics. Furthermore, Tripp notes 
that troubling practices in relation to the independence of parliament and the judiciary are 
emerging.132 Michael Keating also argues that parliament is losing is effectiveness in the 
face of the increasing personalized nature of presidential rule.133  This increased 
centralization of power in Museveni leads to the repression of the opposition, which 
serves to further entrench the status quo power relationships. Roger Tangri further details 
this repression of political opposition to personal rule by noting the number of ministers 
fired in the run-up to the 2004 constitutional changes.134 Lastly, as argued previously the 
number of presidentially appointed cabinet positions have increased and this has served 
to further entrench personal rule in Uganda.  
As is illustrated in the previous paragraph numerous elements of personal rule are 
emerging in Uganda and one of the most disturbing is the parliamentary independence. 
The longer Museveni stays in power the more wedded to his personal rule the 
composition of parliament becomes. The longer Museveni is in power the less likely the 
party composition in parliament is going to change (Table 16). With this increased 
likelihood of inertia against change MPs will continue to promote Museveni’s rule in 
attempt to promote their own NRM credentials and inadvertently further entrench 
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personal rule. Thus, the possibilities exist that if parliament continues in its current party 
composition Ugandan democracy could erode as power is gradually shifted more and 
more towards the president.  
Table 16. Ugandan Parliamentary Composition by Party Since 2006.  
Year Total NRM Seats (% of total) 
2006135 206 (69%) 
2011136 279 (83%) 
 
As argued the effect this institutionalization of personal rule could be devastating 
for Ugandan society. Institutionalized personal rule can only survive so long as the 
charismatic figurehead of the institution still exists. Once a power transition takes place 
in Uganda the chances of political life spiraling out of control in Uganda are high. One 
merely has to recall the erratic nature of the Amin years for an example of personalized 
rule run amok. The lifting of presidential term limits and the continued possible 
weakening of parliament137 likely portend a possible return to the chaos of the Amin 
years. While the level of mass killing is not likely to happen again the level of personal 
corruption and governmental collapse are strong possibilities once Museveni leaves 
office.  
Conclusion 
From the evidence presented in this chapter and the previous one it is clear that Museveni 
and other political authorities’ effects on society are mixed. Ultimately he achieved some 
of his desired end results of stimulating economic and national development, but at what 
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cost? There is little evidence that the north/south ethnic tensions have subsided as a result 
of these positive effects and the negative consequences only serve to further entrench 
these ethnic divisions. Furthermore, far from shifting power towards social identities 
Museveni’s initiatives have further entrenched his own political power and 
institutionalized personal rule. By further entrenching his own political power Museveni 
has further entrenched the status quo power distribution in society.  The longer Museveni 
says in power the more likely it will be that power will only be redistributed away from 
Museveni via revolutionary means. 
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CONCLUSION:MUSEVENI’S ECONOMY OF AFFECTION 
 The preceding chapters modeled how societal power structures have shifted 
under Museveni, the mechanisms of Museveni’s power maintenance and the 
consequences of Museveni’s presidential tenure. The model outlined in chapter 2 
describes how societal power has shifted during Museveni’s tenure, but it fails to capture 
the full political logic of Museveni’s actions. This concluding chapter will attempt to 
synthesize some of the arguments presented in chapters 1-3in order to fill in the gaps the 
model presents in understanding Museveni’s motivations and political logic. This logic 
illustrates that Museveni’s governed Uganda according to the underlying political 
landscape of Ugandan society, namely the ethnically fractious nature of society. His 
choice to govern in this manner has led to his declining favorability in Western circles. 
These realities are central to developing a proper understanding of Museveni’s 
centralization of power. This final section will briefly elaborate on the historical nature of 
these realities and the role they play in shaping Ugandan politics. 
Ugandan Political Realities 
A distinct north-south ethno-linguistic divide and kinship loyalties underscore 
Ugandan society. Each of these realities interconnects with the others to form a complex 
political landscape outside of which the actions of political actors cannot be understood. 
These realties are products of the distinct historical context of Uganda. While not wholly 
unique to Uganda, these realities both constrain and facilitate Museveni’s actions during 
his tenure.  
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North-South Ethno-linguistic division 
Uganda is ethnically divided along a north-south demarcation. This division is the 
result of migration patterns beginning in the early fourteenth century. Around that time 
the continental Bantu migration was underway, which migration brought Africans of 
Bantu ethnicity to southern Uganda.138 The sedentary nature of these tribes facilitated and 
enhanced their organizational opportunities.139 Tribal structures soon began to emerge 
according to kinship linkages in specific localities and over time became highly 
organized ethno-political kingdoms. Concurrently to this migration there was also a 
migration from the region of present-day South Sudan.140 However, unlike the mainly 
sedentary patterns of southerners, northern tribes were more diffuse after coming from 
less sedentary living styles of their origin. Thus, northern tribes established more fluid 
tribal structures than those in the south.  
These two broad ethnicities were juxtaposed in a single state as part of the British 
colonial empire. Favoring indirect colonial rule, the British used the more organized 
southern Bantu tribes, principally the Buganda but others as well, to administer colonial 
affairs and the northern tribes in providing security for the colony.141 Ugandan society 
was constructed under this division of labor and this system continued until independence 
in 1962. The historical legacies of this division of labor continue to be seen with most of 
the professional class coming from southern Uganda and much of the military, until 
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Museveni’s tenure, coming from the north. This informal class system permeates 
Ugandan social thinking and interaction. It is difficult for parties from both halves to 
interact constructively on many issues. This ethno-linguistic division has entrenched 
kinship loyalty as a dominant political reality in society.  
Kinship Loyalties 
The strength of kinship loyalties derives from the ethno-linguistic distinctness of 
Ugandan’s north-south division. The absence of a unifying state apparatus allowed 
localized tribal structures to construct themselves around kinship linkages. British 
colonial structures, to include British government paradigms, were then superimposed 
upon these localized, informal structures.142Under the influence of colonial rule and post-
independence mirroring of colonial political structures, formal institutions gradually 
gained some level of societal legitimacy within prevailing informal institutions. Over 
time a syncretic mixture of formal and informal institutions began to emerge.143 The 
syncretic nature of the institutional structure has influenced, and continues to influence 
Ugandan society today. An anecdote will illustrate how this syncretic system operates.144 
No Cameras in the Market 
While filming a documentary in 2005 Steve and his Ugandan friend Prosper were 
shooting footage in the St. Balikudembe (Owino) Market. The purpose of this footage 
was documentary in nature and apolitical. However the entourage of several Americans 
with expensive looking camera equipment intrigued market security guards. These guards 
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held formal positions within the local government security forces and were paid through 
public funds; they represented the formal institutions and the legitimacy of these 
institutions. With AK-47’s in tow the security guards confronted the film crew and 
escorted them to offices above the market. Upon further discussion it was made clear that 
filming in the marketplace was no longer going to be permitted. However, during the 
conversation a distant kinship linkage emerged between Prosper and the lead security 
guard. The situation was then diffused and Steve’s entourage was let go without any 
further complications or questions. All parties in the filmcrew understood that the kinship 
linkage allowed them to avoid complications. Thus, the underlying informal relationship 
between Prosper and the guard overrode the formal enforcement 
This anecdote is representative of the broader societal picture the model 
developed in chapter 1 overlooks, but can be understood by a more hybrid model of 
society. By simply modeling the structural power shifts that occurred, the model has a 
tendency to underestimate the importance of underlying political realities. Now that these 
two dominant political realities of Ugandan society have been briefly sketched one can 
now understand why Museveni governed in the manner that he did.  
The Affection of Patronage 
Within the context of the Ugandan political realities outlined aboveone can begin 
to understand Museveni’s political logic. As argued in chapter 2 Museveni has 
constructed different patronage systems in the north and the south. Far from being mere 
schizophrenia the differing mechanisms of distributive patronage underscore the 
underlying ethno-political dynamics of Ugandan society. These underlying dynamics 
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constrained Museveni’s ability to govern Uganda in a manner acceptable to Western 
governments. In order to maintain stability and the territoriality of Uganda Museveni 
needed support from both northern and southern ethnic populations.Hyden’s model of 
“economies of affection145” further illuminates this political logic. 
In short, Hyden’s ‘economies of affection’ model describes a number of the 
informal institutions underlying African politics.Hyden argues that the core principles of 
an economy of affection are: “(a) whom you know is more important than what you 
know, (b) sharing personal wealth is more rewarding than investing in economic growth 
and (c) a helping hand today generates returns tomorrow.”146 Hyden further argues that 
this political economy is not established as a system of graft, but rather as a system of 
“informal social support.”147This system of informal social support is interwoven with 
and apart of kinship linkages. Hyden argues that these sentiments of duty are “socially 
embedded in the sense that [they] presuppose personal interdependece.148Simply put 
those to whom you have a kinship linkage desreve, if not require, your social support and 
you theirs. The social responsibilities one has to kin are unavoidable and constrain 
poltical action in Uganda. Recognizing and operating within these constraints has 
allowed Museveni to extend his presidential tenure to the extent that he has.  
The two most prominent features of Museveni’s patronage regime that have led to 
his centralization and personalization of power (decentralization and the cabinet) can 
more fully be understood as economies of affection. Museveni has used decentralization 
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to purchase northern ethnic loyalty, thus reducing northern elite’s claims to clientelistic 
support and cabinet positions to reward southern ethnic loyalty. Not only has Museveni 
established himself as the provider of benefit in both cases, but has allowed those directly 
receiving benefits to establish their own economies of affection. This establishment of 
cascading economies of affection further entrenches Museveni’s centralization of power. 
Both patronage mechanisms can be understood as distinct political choices and Hyden’s 
model suggests several reasons why these distinct political choices were made.  
The Affection of Decentralization 
As argued above the ethno-linguistic divide between north and south underscores 
Ugandan society. Most often individuals will self-identify with their broader ethnic group 
above any other. This reality constrained Museveni’s political vision of national unity: 
without the support from northerners no national unity could be established. However, 
Museveni’s southern identity constrained his ability to garner support from northerners. 
Hyden’s model would suggest that Museveni decentralization scheme was organized as 
such to allow Museveni to establish himself as benefactor to the north at the expense of 
already existing ethnic patron/client structures. 
Establishing himself as benefactor to the north undercut political and traditional 
leaders. Through the establishment of ever-smaller districts Museveni allowed new 
political authorities to emerge that were loyal to him. Undercutting current regional 
political authorities through the decentralization process has allowed Museveni to 
purchase spaces of political loyalty in northern Uganda. Furthermore, these new 
authorities, captured by Museveni, could then establish their own clientelistic network 
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loyal to Museveni. Through this process Museveni has made it more important that 
northerners recognize Museveni as the political patron, then local political or traditional 
leaders. Furthermore, the process of rebuilding the conflict ravaged north will further 
erode the standing of ethnic regional leaders as they have little monetary support to offer 
individuals. Conversly, Museveni has the multitude of state resources to rebuild the 
northern economy.This erosion will likely shift support away from these leaders and 
towards Museveni once northern Ugandan begins to see the benefits of Museveni’s 
economy of affection. 
The Affection of the Cabinet 
Hyden’s model further suggests that southern ethnic groups expected Museveni to 
distribute powerful cabinet positions to them. One could even go so far to say that 
Museveni was constrained by these ethnic affiliations to provide such positions and 
failure to meet this obligation would not be seen as a viable option. Given Uganda’s 
powerful ethnic relationships Museveni’s southern affiliations could not go unrewarded if 
he was to accomplish his national vision. With many of his cohorts entering power with 
him in 1986 it was an uncomplicated task for Museveni to distribute political positions to 
these individuals. As his tenure progressed it became more ever more important to reward 
loyalty.  
As previously demonstrated Museveni’s cabinet size has dramatically increased 
since his tenure began; this growth suggests Museveni’s growing need to reward loyalty 
and establish himself as premier benefactor to the south. In expanding the size of his 
cabinet Museveni not only purchased southern loyalty, but established a system whereby 
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recipients of cabinet positions could establish their own economy of affection. There 
would be no reason to fear coup attempts so long as this economy of affection continued 
to grow. Hypothetically once Museveni’s patronage recipients established fulfilled their 
own ethnic obligations their recipients would develop a loyalty to Museveni.   
Through both of these patronage agendas Museveni personalized Ugandan 
politics. The most interesting aspect of this personalization is that it has occurred through 
the informalization of formal institutions (decentralization and the cabinet). This 
informalization is a product of the realities of Ugandan society and has proceeded 
according to a political logic. Constrained by ethnic division in the north Museveni 
pursued a patronage strategy constructed to undermine local traditional and political 
leaders. Further constrained by expectations of patronage in the south Museveni further 
informalized power according to these expectations. His distribution of power cabinet 
positions to southerners concretized Museveni’s position as the head of a series of 
cascading patron-client relationships throughout southern Uganda.  
Conclusion 
The previous paragraphs have been an attempt to fill one major gap in the model 
developed in chapter 1. Placing Museveni’s centralization of societal power within the 
context of Hayden’s economies of affection model has given a more complete analysis of 
the dynamics of societal power structures in Uganda. The conclusions of this thesis also 
illuminate several avenues for further research into Ugandan society and politics, as well 
as African politics in general. First, this thesis primarily dealt with the domestic societal 
power structures of Uganda. It has said nothing of how these structures affect Uganda’s 
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international political and economic relations. Understanding how patronage structures 
affect Uganda’s integration into the international economy would be useful in 
determining the full consequences of authoritarian patronage systems. Second, 
Museveni’s dual patronage system has allowed political authorities to maintain their 
political tenure for nearly three decades. More research should be conducted into the 
extent that multiple, differing patronage schemes operate within African countries 
experiencing similar governing tenures. Third, the informalization of formal political 
institutions may lead to the collapse of institutional structures once Museveni leaves 
office. Research into the possible processes of reformalization of institutions after their 
informalization will develop possible policy implications for societies that experience 
these types of political systems.  
Given the realities of Ugandan politics the question remains as to why Western 
states acclaimed Museveni (and the other new generation of African leaders) as 
watersheds in African politics. From the standpoint argued in this thesis Western leaders 
fundamentally misunderstood the realities of African politics. This fundamental 
misunderstanding primarily stemmed from the apparent denial of kinship realties within 
African politics. It is not so much that Museveni has fallen short of his acclaim; rather it 
is more that this acclaim was too hastily given without an understanding of Ugandan 
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